

KARADENİZ TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY * THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER'S PROGRAM



LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR AND LAWMAKING IN NIGERIA

MASTER'S THESIS

Abdulrahman Musa MOHAMMED

March-2021

TRABZON

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Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Alper Tolga BULUT

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APPROVAL

Upon the submission of the dissertation, **Abdulrahman Musa MOHAMMED** has defended the study “**Legislative Behavior And Lawmaking In Nigeria**” in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of International Relations at Karadeniz Technical University, and the study has been found fully adequate in scope and quality as a thesis by **unanimous/majority** vote on **02.04.2021**.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Parliamentary behavior has been an important area of research in political science, and comparative politics in particular. The mechanisms underlying the decisions taken by the legislators in the parliament have been studied from many dimensions in the academic literature and the effect of different factors has been revealed. These studies suggested that the determinants of parliamentary behavior should be addressed at both the systemic and individual levels. In this context, while factors such as geography, parliamentary rules, party membership are effective at the system level, other factors such as the gender, religion and ethnic origin of the legislator are considered to be determinative at the individual level.

This study deals with parliamentary behavior models through the example of Nigeria. In this context, the main subject of the research is which factors shape the parliamentary behavior of the legislators in the Nigerian national assembly. Thus, the determinants of parliamentary behavior at the system and individual level were revealed by utilizing quantitative analysis of parliamentary behavior in Nigeria. The results of the quantitative analysis reveal that especially gender, ethnicity and party affiliation are the main factors that determine parliamentary behavior.

This thesis makes two important contributions to the literature. First of all, current studies in the field of parliamentary behavior largely focus on developed western countries. It is not known whether the dynamics of parliamentary behavior will differ in countries with weak institutionalization, such as Nigeria, as these countries mostly have an established and institutionalized political structure and parliamentary system. In this context, this thesis is among the first academic studies to examine parliamentary behavior in African parliaments. Secondly, within the scope of this thesis, an original data set covering a ten-year time period was collected and content-coded. Thus, an extremely important data set belonging to a country with a weakly institutionalized party system has been brought to the academic literature.

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ÖZET

Bu tez, Nijerya'daki yasama davranışı ve yasa koymanın derinlemesine bir analizini yapmayı amaçlamıştır. Ayrıca, cinsiyet, din, etnik köken ve parti üyeliği gibi karar verme sürecinde yasa koyucuların davranışlarını etkileyen faktörler, mevcut ve geçmiş mevzuatın ve uygulanan yasaların neden şu anda olduğu gibi şekillendiğine dair makul cevaplar elde etmek için incelenmiştir. Aynı zamanda, Nijerya yasama meclisinin tarihsel arka planı ve oluşumu, yukarıda belirtilen faktörlerle birlikte titizlikle incelenmiştir ve Nijerya'daki mevcut demokratik dağıtımda oynadıkları role sürekli olarak vurgu yapılmıştır.

Bu araştırma, gelişen demokrasilerde parlamenter siyaset üzerine daha fazla araştırma yapılmasının önünü açan bazı kritik bulguları ortaya çıkarmayı başarmıştır. Birincisi, din ve siyaset gibi dışsal faktörlerin yasa koyucuların ve politika yapıcıların yasaları yaparken davranışlarını nasıl şekillendirdiği ve toplumsal oluşumun önemli bir bölümünü etkilemede nasıl uzun bir yol kat ettiği. İkincisi, içsel olarak kabul edilen ve insanların toplumdaki günlük yaşamlarına uyum sağlamaya çalışan (yerel veya taban faktörü olarak da bilinir), dolayısıyla onların dürtülerinin her parçasını etkileyen etnisitedir; başka bir deyişle bu, yasa koyucuların ve politika yapıcıların devlet merkezli politikalar oluştururken tutumlarında tekrarlanır. Üçüncü önemli faktör ise cinsiyettir. Cinsiyet temsili-eşitsizlik Nijerya toplumunda çok kritik bir konu olmuştur. Yapılan politikalar cinsiyete duyarlı olmadığından temsilin bu yönünde çok fazla çalışmaya ihtiyaç duyulan büyük bir gecikme var olmaktadır.

Bu sebeple, bu araştırma, Nijerya bağlamında parlamenter siyaset araştırmasının bir özeti niteliğindedir. Bulgular ayrıca Afrika'daki diğer konsolide demokrasilerde yasama siyasetinin nasıl çalıştığına dair bir anlayış geliştirmeye de hizmet edebilmektedir. Bulgular aynı zamanda Nijerya'daki yasama siyasetinin diğer gelişmiş Batılı ülkelerle karşılaştırılmasına da yardımcı olabilecek niteliktedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nijerya, Yasama, Din, Etnisite, Cinsiyet, Demokrasi.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation aimed to make an in-depth analysis of the legislative behavior and lawmaking in Nigeria. More so, factors that affect the behaviors of legislators during the decision making such as gender, religion, ethnic background, and party affiliation were looked into in order to get plausible answers as to why the present and past legislation and laws being made and implemented took the shape they currently are. In addition, however, the historical background and formation of the Nigerian legislature, along with the aforementioned factors, were also rigorously studied, and emphasis was placed on the role they have continually played on the existing democratic dispensation in Nigeria.

This research was able to expose some critical findings that pave the way for further research on parliamentary politics in developing democracies. One is how the exogenous factors such as religion and politics shape legislators' and policymakers' behavior while making laws and how it goes a long way in influencing a considerable part of the social formation. Second is ethnicity, which is deemed endogenous and has been what sought to align into the people's everyday lives in society (otherwise known as the local or grassroots factor), hence influencing every part of their impulses; this is, in other words, replicated in the attitudes of legislators and policymakers while they make policies centered towards the state. The third important factor is gender. Gender representation-inequality has been a very critical issue in Nigerian society. Policies made are not at all gender-sensitive, so there is a massive lapse in this aspect of representation that needs much work to be done in order to address this issue, be it political, economic, or social.

Therefore, this research serves as a synopsis of parliamentary politics research in the context of Nigeria. The findings may also serve to develop an understanding regarding how legislative politics works in other consolidating democracies in Africa. The findings may also be helpful in comparing legislative politics in Nigeria with other developed Western nations.

Keywords: Nigeria, Lawmaking, Religion, Ethnicity, Gender, Democracy.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCORD	: Accord Party
ADC	: African Democratic Congress
ADP	: Action Democratic Party
AG	: Action Group
AKP	: Justice and Development Party
APC	: All Progressive Congress
DPP	: Democratic People's Party
EPR	: Elective Principle of Representation
EU	: European Union
EP	: European Parliament
GNPP	: Great Nigeria People's Party
HDI	: Human Development Indicators
JMA	: Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa
LE	: Legislative Experience
LP	: Labour Party
MDA	: Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MEP	: Members of European Parliament
MPLE	: Member of Parliament's Legislative Experience
MPs	: Members of Parliament
NAP	: National Advance Party
NCNC	: National Council of Nigeria Citizens
NEPU	: Northern Element Progressive Union
NNDP	: Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	: Northern People Congress
NPN	: National Party of Nigeria
NPP	: Nigeria People's Party
NRC	: National Republican Convention
NYM	: Northern Youth Movement
PDP	: People's Democratic Party
PLAC	: Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre
PRP	: People's Redemption Party
SDP	: Social Democratic Party
SMD	: Single Member Districts

TPA : Theory of Planned Action
TRA : Theory of Reasoned Action
UMBC : United Middle Belt Congress
UN : United Nations
UNDP : United Nations Development Program
UPC : Unity Party of Nigeria
UPN : Unity Party of Nigeria



INTRODUCTION

The legislature is the ubiquitous institution of political operation. The legislature's existence in a democratic system serves as an “essential tool for most democratic governments” and a significant element toward the maintenance and sustenance of modern democracy (Loewenberg, 2011: 18). Because all the people cannot individually participate in governance affairs, the privileges and responsibilities associated with this role are assigned to a select group of elected representatives known as Members of Parliament (MPs). MPs are expected to perform legislative functions related to (but not restricted to) lawmaking, which involves drafting bills, delivering speeches in the floor or asking written or oral question in order to perform oversight.

However, more substantive studies have over the last few years been conducted to understand how the legislature is set up, why they exist, their relevance, how the organization is developed and what explains the nature of its consistency, and how intriguing it would be for it to function effectively. MPs are bestowed with authority by mandates of their constituents and legitimized constitutionally (depending on the system), and making laws and binding decisions on people that are conducted. In making these laws, they are guided by institutional rules and procedures, party affiliation and commitments, ideologies and beliefs that are directed by goals and agendas that are established within and outside the legislature, and motivated by the desire to remain in office and existentially operate for a more extended period (Loewenberg, 2011: 14).

Shepsle (1979) notes that “It has long been recognized in the field of parliamentary theory that members of congress are expected to fit within the bounds of their parties' self-imposed frameworks of thought” (Shepsle, 1979: 18). Most attention that has been given to this research field has been focused on institutions (for example, legislative committees) internal to the legislative body itself, with little attention given to the analysis of how external institutions influence and determine legislative behavior. For example, in the United States, the legislature (Congress) has been at the center of increasing attention from political behavioralists in recent years.

Although political scientists have studied the United States legislature and other legislative bodies for many years, there seems to be a challenge in developing or constructing a generally accepted theory of legislative behavior. Researchers in this field of study have instead used concepts borrowed from sociology and psychology, such as norms, values, socialization, integration, role, and the likes, in explaining political behavior.

Although many researchers have come up with intuitions about how activities and alterations in the legislative institution and other exogenous institutions affect the operation and behavior of MP (Rosenthal, 1981; Grumm, 1963; Belknap, 1958), there is still the demand for a deeper understanding of how legislative behavior affects legislative activities than the lack of a general theoretical framework of explanation. Previous researches highlighted the possible role of certain variables such as, “gender, social status, faith, parliamentary seniority, committee membership, party allegiance, staff interest groups, lobbyists, constituencies of Members of Parliament, and personal views and values” (Belknap, 1958: 4).

However, studies focused on Africa's political behavior have explained how the legislatures are emerging as institutions to be reckoned with in various nations. Unlike during military rule, where legislatures were just rubber-stamp for the executive, recent data reveals that legislatures are emerging to assert their independence and play roles of being political players responsible for putting the executives in check. They are also responding to citizens' demand by making laws that would be popular among the public. Hence, despite being relatively weak in some political arenas in the continent, they are gradually becoming- in most places- recognized in politics (Barkan, 2009). Factors such as cultural pluralism and political socialization have also been influential in determining political behavior.

In Nigeria, which is the focus of our study, the transition to democratic rule in 1999 marked a milestone for the nation considering the series of military interregnums, which lasted for about thirty years, reifying coups with counter-coups that structured the nation's polity. However, from the fourth Republic onwards (which is so far the most extended civil-democratic rule, and continuing), as the nation struggles to recuperate from its weak political history and thrive on liberal democratic paths, it is still marred with social conflicts.

Hence, this makes the country remain evidentially sloppy on issues impinging on the people's socioeconomic conditions and legislation, making for the citizens' general good. Therefore, looking at the current political scene, the consistent prebendal nature of political rivalries among the elites and those within the helm of affairs, the indiscipline, and corrupt practices have nurtured unvisionary leaders. As Sklar (1963) rightly explains, it has cumulatively set the trajectory of democratic practice inherent within the nation's political spectrum and political behavior in most institutions.

From the preceding, it would be pertinent to say that the legislature has been weakened by the political abnormalities inherent in today's Nigerian political landscape. The impediments to legislative behavior in Nigeria are wholistic. The system affects its functionalities, just as the factors entrenched within its formation. Thus, the MPs' image perceived by public opinion vividly reveals that they outrightly pursue personal interests- ranging from financial ineptitude and protracted

corrupt practices, weak political foresight, and the disregard for public attitude towards these actions- have cumulatively explained why the institutional framework is getting continuously weaker.

Against this background, this dissertation aims to analyze the legislative behavior and lawmaking in Nigeria and explore the dynamics of parliamentary behavior in the Nigerian legislature. Borrowing insights from previous researches on parliamentary politics in institutionalized party systems, this study argues that legislative process in Nigeria presents a dynamic nature. Hence, the parliamentary behavior of individual MPs is formed through the interaction of different variables such as religion, ethnicity, gender, and political/party affiliation. The dissertation also highlights the role of center-periphery dynamics as an important determinant of parliamentary behavior in Nigeria.

Studies focused on the legislature, particularly legislative behavior, have been at the center of increasing attention from political behavioralists. The exploration of these studies shows a contrasting approach from the traditional approach, particularly the institutionalist approach in the study of legislative behavior. Recent studies focusing on exogenous or external institutions reveal that other factors have been influential in determining legislative behavior, such as political socialization, career ambition, norms, religion.

Thus, studies focusing on Africa intensify the challenge and argument of having a generally accepted theory of understanding legislative behavior from a central perspective (Barkan, 2009: 13). In Nigeria, for example, as our focus of study, factors such as political socialization and cultural pluralism, religion, and gender, have been at the core of interest in the legislative process; thus, how these factors play significant roles is what will be investigated in this dissertation. Against this backdrop, this study examines legislative behavior and lawmaking in Nigeria. Based on the theoretical framework outlined above, the following questions will be explored:

- Why MPs behave the way they do? What motivations do they have?
- What is the role of religion in parliamentary behavior?
- What is the role of gender in parliamentary behavior? Who represents women's interests in politics?
- Is there a Center-Periphery divide in Nigerian legislative politics?
- What is the role of Clientelism/Prebendalism in the Nigerian legislative system?

This dissertation aims to examine legislative behavior and lawmaking in Nigeria. It seeks to expand previous researches that aim to understand legislative behavior on lawmaking from an African perspective. Notably, the study examines through a case study examination of Nigeria's Seventh and Eight Assemblies (legislature), focusing on legislation/laws brought to the assemblies' floor. Similarly, to have a clear insight on legislative behavior and legislation making in Nigeria, pertinent to explore the Nigerian legislature's historical background and the formation; and

the political behavior and practice of politics in Nigeria. It is thus the objective of the study to:

- To identify the primary determinants of legislative behavior in lawmaking in Nigeria.
- To ascertain how Nigeria's cultural pluralistic nature affects legislative behavior during lawmaking.
- To evaluate how the factors determining legislative behavior in Nigeria can be understood better to improve legislative behavior.

Although many studies have been conducted in the context of developed Western countries, few have been centered on legislative behavior and lawmaking, particularly from an African perspective. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap in the literature by providing an additional perspective to the studies on legislative behavior and policymaking. This dissertation will proceed as follows. The introductory part discusses the study's context, the research dilemma/problem, the academic research's intent, its significance, the operational definition of critical terms, and the study's disposition.

The first chapter portrays the Nigerian political history and legislative politics critically. The second chapter expiates legislative behavior literature, with formidable and objective works inclined to our study's focus. The third chapter contains the work's methodology and holistic empirical analysis, and the last part summarizes the study findings, the conclusion, and the recommendations. This research's scope will revolve exclusively around the legislative behavior and lawmaking- with specific limitations to the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies of 2011 to 2019- and the factors responsible for shaping legislative actions during lawmaking processes.

CHAPTER ONE

1. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1.1. The Nigerian Legislature: Historical Perspective

According to Adebo (1988), the statutory institution in Nigeria dates all the way back to 1861, when the British colonial government formally annexed Lagos (Adebo, 1988: 4). The British colonial government in Nigeria established a legislative council to oversee the colony's affairs when it took over the Lagos colony. Ten members were handpicked in the legislature, with only two serving as Nigerians. During that time, the legislative council was mandated simply with mere advisory roles- this means they could not make laws whatsoever- to the Governor-General who ruled the Colonial Administration.

The protectorate of the North and South of Nigeria both came into being in 1900, after the British occupation of the region (Adebo, 1988: 15). After about six years, Lagos got annexed to the Southern protectorate of Nigeria. A few years later, precisely in 1914, both protectorates' amalgamation took place, giving birth to Nigeria as a whole piece (Flint, 1960). As the new setup came to being, a new body was formed, known for its legislative functions, being the Nigerian council. This body comprised about thirty-six randomly selected members, of whom six were Nigerians that the British colonial government had directly appointed to orchestrate the colony's affairs. Nevertheless, like the previous legislative council, there was no legislative power bestowed on it to carry out necessary legislative functions (Flint, 1960: 3).

However, a new legislative development occurred in 1922, and a new constitution emanated- the Clifford Constitution. It introduced an elective principle that made provisions for four Nigerians' elections in forty-six (46) members' legislative council. "The Colonial Governor appointed, nominated, or handpicked the forty-two non-Nigerian representatives" (Crowder, 1968: 6). The Clifford constitution was repealed and replaced by "The 1946 constitution of Richard, the 1951 Macpherson constitution, and the 1954 Lyttleton constitution" (Crowder, 1968: 7). The succeeding constitutions maintained the Clifford constitution's elective principle by further increasing "the number of Nigerians endowed with the responsibility of representing the country's interest through the newly formed council" (Crowder, 1968: 8).

Towards the end of 1960, precisely in October, Nigeria attained independence from British rule and then became a full republic after three years, being 1963. As this ensued, Nigeria maintained a replica of the British-styled bicameral legislature symptomatic of a classical parliamentary system that permitted two chambers- Upper and Lower Houses (House of Lords and Commons which was translated in a Nigerian style to be Senate and Representatives, replica of the US system)- to operate thereafter. Similarly, the House of Chiefs and the House of Assembly were formed around Nigeria's regional governments. The then-Senate and the House of Chiefs served as the federation's and regions' Upper Houses (Adebo, 1988: 14).

The House of Representatives comprised 312 elected members nationwide to serve a five-year single term and a senate consisting of 44 members elected from the country's federal system (Adebo, 1988: 14). "The military in Nigeria, in 1966, interrupted the governing system until 1979, when Nigeria began another republic" (Adebo, 1988: 8). Despite the retaining of the bicameral legislature renaming it 'National Assembly', The territories that became states eventually developed into unicameral governments. Nigeria maintained a replica of the legislative arrangement existent during the Third Republic in 1992, which was after another military interregnum in governance. Just like the second republic, there was popular representation in the National Assembly.

For House of Representatives elections, "It was divided into electoral districts in accordance with the law that the borders of a single constituency may cross more than one state. On average, 450 seats in the House of Representatives had to be filled, with one deputy representing every 100,000 or so voters" (Graf, 1988). Elections to the Senate were held on a geographical unit basis. "Each state in Nigeria, regardless of size, was subdivided into five roughly equivalent territorial constituencies, each of which elected one senator. A Senate of 96 members was founded as the legislative order's highest legislative body" (Graf, 1988: 24).

Adebo (1988) notes that institutionalizing the geographical principle of representation and establishing two chambers of the legislature with "similar functions result from similar interests that produced federalism and Nigeria's federal character principle. From the fourth Republic onwards, therefore, the practice of bicameralism, as established under section four (4) of Nigeria's constitution, still prevails. Thus, the governing body is composed of 109 Senate members and 360 House of Representatives members" (Adebo, 1998: 3). These figures juxtapose a composition of representatives from all districts and wards in the geographical entity to permit equal representation of every Nigerian.

Although it is a simulation of the United States Congress, which is designed to provide an equal representation of three Senators in a single-member district, the House of Representatives has unequal distribution because the states/provinces are given distribution reflecting mainly their sizes and economic importance. However, only the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) has one (1) Senator

and two (2) House of Reps members, respectively (National Secretariat of the Nigerian Legislatures, 2004: 88).

1.2. Political Parties in Nigeria

Political parties in Nigeria date all the way back to the British colonial period. Prior to the arrival of colonial rule in Nigeria, the parliamentary party was an alien organization. However, as noted by Ekeh (1983) and Coleman (1958), "nationalist pressures under colonial rule encouraged the establishment of a parliamentary legislature, precipitating the development and founding of political parties" (Ekeh, 1983: 9; Coleman, 1958: 3). According to Ujo (2000), the history of political party creation in Nigeria can be divided into four generations: According to Ujo, the first wave of political parties consists of those formed prior to 1945, at the conclusion of World War II.

The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), established in 1923, and the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), founded in 1936, were among the existing parties (Ujo, 2000: 2). Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018) observe that these parties were rooted in their communities and that their interests as parties were limited but distinct colonialist policies. The authors contend that this factorial manifestation may have contributed to the era's scarcity of racial and tribal political events. The second wave, or groups, formed after 1945 and the collapse of the first Republic, includes "the Northern People Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG), as well as the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC)" (Danjibo and Ashindorbe, 2018: 14).

The main goal of these groups was to achieve independence from the British colonialists. Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018), however, observe that the groups devolved into ethnic-based configurations and were hijacked by their leaders. The then "communities" played a major role in the emergence of these political parties (Danjibo, 2018: 6). "The Action Group party (AG) was established in reaction to the NCNC's increasing presence and prominence in the western region. AG's origins in the western region can be traced back to the pan-Yoruba sociocultural organisation" (Mackintosh, 1966: 17).

Similarly, "the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which grew out of a cultural organization named Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (Association of People from the North), declared its mission to fight idleness and injustice in the northern region" (Dudley, 1968: 4). According to Yakub (2004), "the cultural and ethnic origins of these parties, especially the NPC and the AG, resulted in conflict between two cultural groups who shared a common goal of defending regional interests while battling for electoral gains against a rival party" (Yakub, 2004: 12); this strategy, Yakub (2004) argues, only served to exacerbate ethnic animosity within these cultural groups.

Nonetheless, these forces worked cooperatively to secure Nigeria's independence in 1960. However, "intra-party and inter-party rivalries marked these political parties even after independence, leaving political parties controlled by race, which continues to reverberate in contemporary Nigerian democracy" (Yakub, 2004: 24). According to Ujo's grouping, the third generation of political parties were those founded during the Second Republic (1979-1983). The second Republic saw a wave of legislative and electoral changes that ushered in a new age for Nigeria's political parties. "Political parties were specified more in terms of form than operation, with an emphasis on the institutional criteria for registration, such as democratic principles, national reach, national outlook and approval, and registration with an electoral management agency" (Danjibo, Ashindorbe, 2018: 12).

Among other things, the Second Republic's institutional and electoral amendments sought to eradicate the personalization of political party activities and race by endowing parties with a geographical perspective (Omoruyi, 2002). "Within this grouping, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP), the People's Redemption Party (PRP), and the National Advance Party (NAP) were included" (Omoruyi, 2002: 23).

In the fourth generation of Ujo's classification, "complicated conditions for party registration and public financing of groups, such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), significant encroachment of ethnic and regional rivalries among them" was minimized (Omoruyi, 2002: 6). By gradually limiting ethnoreligious politics, the formation and evolution of the SDP and NRC mitigated national security and integration challenges. Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018) concluded that "this argument is unequivocally verifiable based on evidence from the 1989–1993 sequence of elections" (Ashindorbe, 2018: 3).

However, since the fourth republic began in 1999, the evolution of political parties has been interpreted differently by various citizens in the current dispensation. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, quoted in Anifowoshe (2004), describes the party as "a complex amalgam of interest groups kept together by, if anything, the fact that the party is in control and therefore the heavy presumption of patronage" (Anifowoshe, 2004: 65).

According to Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018), this declaration by Nigeria's former ruler "captures the root of the country's malaise and partially explains why the present-day political parties of the fourth Republic and this dispensation have failed to serve their position as organs for national growth and integration" (Danjibo, 2018: 8). The scheme reflects lawmakers' frequent swapping of political parties to further their supposed goals. According to Danjibo and Ashindorbe (2018), the "July 2013 formation of the All Progressive Congress (APC) by diverse leading opposition leaders and a breakaway group from the People's Democratic Party (PDP) regarded as

party dissenters who collapsed their respective platforms to form a broad-based party represents the latest phase in the nation's democratic revolution" (Danjibo, 2018: 11).



CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR

One fundamental concept of political behavior is the concept of legislative behavior. Most works of literature in the study of legislative behavior have looked at legislative behavior from the perspective of institutions such as legislative committees, legislative speeches, legislative performance, legislative tenures, and personal recognition, etcetera, that are internal to the concept (Shugart et al., 2005; Fearon, 1999; Curtice and Shively, 2009; Giannetti and Pedrazzani, 2016; Bulut and İlter, 2020). However, few works of literature explain "how structures external to or more exogenous to the legislature assist in determining and influencing legislative actions during the legislative process" (Proksch & Slapin, 2012; Yildirim et al., 2017; Giannetti et al., 2016; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Bulut, 2020).

Therefore, this review deals with legislative behavior as a quintessential area of what David Easton calls the authoritative allocation of values for societies (lawmaking) (Easton, 1969). Legislative behavior is consequential in lawmaking. Besides, the legislative bodies are also seen as a social system involving behaviors. This position implies that uniformities can be traced in the legislative sub-set of all the behaviors which determine our lawmaking. According to Mayhew (1974), individual orientations and behavior are responsible for the contemporary arguments on individual MPs' orientations and behavior.

As a theory, behavioralism could be viewed from various angles, but one of its basic assumptions is that political institutions (here the legislatures) "are primarily influenced by the populations that occupy them. This individuals are inspired by particular goals, the primary one of which is their own self-interest" (Mayhew, 1974: 4). This paradigm implies that we can understand lawmaking first by examining the individuals serving as members. Mayhew (1974) is of the notion that "purposive behavior offers the best route to an understanding of legislatures," and key to this notion here is re-election, which "underlies everything else" (Mayhew, 1974: 2-5, 16-17).

He observes during a study of US congress members that each member wants his service in the legislature, especially in committees, to bring him or her some levels benefit proportional to the goals they have set for themselves as individual members of the legislature (cited in Fenno, 1973: 1). Nonetheless, Mayhew denotes that MPs conceive their interests and goals from different perspectives, and these differences lead to different patterns of behavior and lawmaking.

Mayhew's (1974) position is a theoretical perspective- purposive, economic, Downsian view that rests on a solid empirical foundation. It is based on the premise that MPs are out for themselves with the self-objective of re-election, the pursuit of their personal goals and careers, the protection of their prestige, and, most importantly, their political power. In other words, before a MP proceeds in lawmaking, he explores the costs and benefits and vehemently contemplates what he has to accrue from it. Against this background, one can thus state that legislative behavior is shaped by the motivations MPs intend to benefit from based on their goals. Hence credit maximization is paramount in influencing legislative behavior.

Further to Mayhew's expositions, "credit claiming" is also a fundamental characteristic of MPs, as they seek to promote their chances for re-election (Mayhew, 1974: 125). Many who sponsor bills for various reasons are wrapped up with thoughts of being engrossed with wealth, and so they enhance their continued standing/representation in their district. In this section, various literature on legislative behavior will be reviewed, and the dimensions to which they manifest and attach inclinations onto, ranging from institutional and non-institutional elements, gender, and other factors analyzed.

Therefore, it is imperative to highlight legislative behavior's significance to legislative politics. Various scholars have made their inputs on legislative behavior and how it revolves around legislative politics' operations, emphasizing how MPs are affected and how their behaviors are shaped while discharging their duties. Thus, this research will start off by focusing on the institutional-level inducing factors of legislative politics and streamlining the analysis down to individual and non-individual level dispensations.

2.1. Institutional and Semi-Institutional Factors Determining Legislative Behavior

2.1.1. Institutional Analysis

Here, we will look at works of literature made based on the premise that the legislative institution and its components- institutional setup and mechanisms through which they operate- directly affect MPs' behavior during the legislative process. Norton (2013: 1) defines the legislature as a body specifically created to enhance measures suitable for forming the laws of the land of any given territory. It means that "the legislature is embodied with the capacity of making responsive laws suitable for governing the local populace of a country" (Norton, 2013: 3). It is indeed apparent that legislatures in every system provide grounds for exquisite plenary meetings and committee sessions, which in other words, cumulatively explains the entire legislative process and how it operates.

According to Martin et al. (2014), legislative studies is a rich and pluralistic field of inquiry in political science. Therefore, they propose three observations on the field's evolution: The first is taking legislative studies back in time during political science's inception as a discipline. Second, legislative analyses have taken a trend from 'traditional' institutionalism in the nineteenth century to 'new' institutionalism at the end of the Second World War, which included a more sophisticated approach beginning in the mid-1980s, and onwards. Thirdly, legislative studies greatly influenced political science's growth as a discipline post-World War II, especially in the US.

As the study of legislatures goes further deeper, it is believed by various scholars that political parties enhance the efficacy of decisions and widespread impacts of legislatures (Cox, 1987; Aldrich, 1995; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). On the other hand, the widespread belief that legislatures are deteriorating is a constant idea, which is due in part on the fact that external/exogenous developments are causing this downward dwindle such as the surge of welfare states which were basically the cause of European legislatures' decline, hence these elements aggravated the informational discord between elected politicians and bureaucrats alike. Herewith, it implies that legislative behavior inturn gets influenced due to the tendency of government officials striking bargains with major producer groups in neo-corporatist dispensations.

Again, Richard and Jordan (1979) highlighted the issue of "post-parliamentary democracy" where legislatures continue to dwindle on two primary paths; one of which is Europeanization within Europe and the other being globalization, and the fact that they play crucial external/exogenous roles in undermining and impinging the power of legislatures. Martin et al. (2014: 12) argue that Western societies are highly differentiated and complex for respective parliaments or governments to monitor and acquire substantial competence and knowledge to be deliberated. This means that legislative oversight in the contemporary world is mostly ineffective because parliamentary representation is territorially organized.

Similarly, Zum (2013: 10), exploring their view from a transnational perspective, the author strongly emphasized that a political authority beyond the nation-state is on the rise, and parliamentary democracy is daunted with series of crises, thereby leading to a shift within the established status-quo of legitimate authority. This, in turn, plays a huge role in affecting legislative behavior on the institutional level as the impact of external forces' presence is felt within the legislature.

Symptomatic of this is exemplary of what Dalton (2004: 10) theorized about citizens' growing strong distrust towards politicians and the current democratic institutions, and are incredibly disillusioned about the current democratic dispensation- this is because they "the politicians" as perceived by the citizens, have lost their principles of working for the national interest and instead turned to foster their interests. As the discourse of legislative studies expanded in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, on the one hand, most publications made about legislatures were featured

by their attributes, while others pinpointed the effect of "old institutionalism"; this meant that emphasis was on the formal institutions of governments' constitutional law, mandate, and history (Peters, 1999). Furthermore, the aforementioned highlight portrays that the old institutionalists believed that formal institutions had a causal effect on behavior, hence legislative actions. Thus, this is partly because of these institutions' historical foundation and the strong normative influence (wholistic rather than individual) entrenched therein.

In line with this assertion, therefore, in as much as it is interwoven with the intellectual roots of political science, the critical normative component of "Old Institutional" research placed a premium on institutional environments conducive to "good governance" which meant that the operations carried out within any such ascribed formal institution will be checkmated, and hence those discharging duties within them. As brought forward by Tocqueville (2000), a perfect example of this assertion is of the United States Congress in *De la democratie en Amerique* 1835.

Similarly, Wilson's (1885) exposition on congressional government in the latter part of the century is highly typical of the normative or 'old institutionalism' in the United States; which was focused on "the normative elements existent within the Congressional institutions and thus applied its institutional reforms to influence legislative behavior" (Wilson, 1885: 26). Further similar but exemplary researches made in Europe also showed the same trend, as institutional mechanisms were dominant in shaping legislative behavior (Bagehot, 1867; Bryce, 1921; Jennings, 1957; Wheare, 1960).

More specifically, when taking a cursory look at the institutionalist literature, it would be deemed futile and incomplete without referring to the works of institutional analysis pundits, which gained momentum in the wake of the 1900s, especially in the 1920s and 1930s when enormous skepticism was affixed on legislatures and parliamentary democracies. This factor continues to take shape because it was believed that legislatures are losing their main character- which was the public arena for political discourse that concerned the public- and that they were continually losing the status-quo of being efficient decision-making bodies, etc. and this aided in the resonation of institutional debates in the aftermath of World War II (Schmitt, 1988).

As legislative studies at macro-level/normative (old institutionalist approach) analysis gradually became obsolete as a result of its unclear nature and failure to comprehend and give a precise analysis on the complexities revolving around the legislature as well as its functions, the need to study the legislature in a more versatile manner resonated. Hence this gave rise to studying the legislature at the macro-level of institutional operations and both micro and macro political approaches to understand the legislature's operation fully; this ranges from political, sociological and behavioral spheres, and hence new institutionalism.

This new system eventually dominated legislative studies from the 1980s onwards because it not just focused restrictively on one side as the former was, but on a holistic level touching on both rational choice analysis and sociological and norms-oriented dimensions. Simply, as Coleman (1986) rightly puts it, it came into effect due to the three decades of empirical research carried out on the behavioral patterns and attitudes of respective legislatures in the US and elsewhere around the globe. In other words, this became a milestone and paved the way for legislative studies to get developed and offered more confidence to scholars to undertake the opportunity to go deeply into researching micro-level assumptions and interests attached to legislative studies.

According to (Shepsle, 2002), the idea of Rational-choice theorists resonated with the influence of formal modeling in the 1960s, thus paving the way for scholars who adhere to the idea of reasonability in the strategic calculations of actors in the arena of the legislative institution. This idea was thus appraised by Loewenberg (2011: 116) as he purports that the feature was significant for use on issues related to legislative institutions and behaviors, and issues such as individuals' strategic actions taken to fulfill their vested interests could be unraveled when researched.

In contrast to the foregoing, therefore, the sociological institutionalists, according to March & Olsen (1984), adhere to the notion that MPs and actors in politics are inclined to the logic of appropriateness. The consequence of this is that there is a cost-benefit analysis of behavior done as a result of the effect political socialization exerts, as well as how the social expectations and beliefs prevalent in the communities of which these human MPs are accustomed, form any or much of their actions. Thus, calculative instincts in the form of logical impulses affect legislative behavior in the legislature, which then sums up the micro-to-macro- setback as identified by Coleman (1986).

Martin et al. (2014) also highlighted the stark difference between the old institutionalists and behavioralists. The latter has a better and more precise definition or a somewhat realistic pattern of explaining individual motivations in legislative politics, and the former has a stark alienation to exogenous elements. The new model seeks to use behavioral premises about how and why the behavioral patterns and motivation to these behaviors manifest while also considering the game-theoretic institution's logic, thus generating functional hypotheses about the observable traits derived from the propositions (Diemeier and Krehbiel, 2003:131).

The main advantage of rational-choice institutionalism, as highlighted by the author, is that it is much flexible and aptly comprehensible in a comparative analyses in the discourse of legislative behavior within the legislative institution. They further highlight the importance of how concepts like 'voting games, veto players and agenda control' enabled researchers to choose from a wide range of data or situations from which they analyze and decipher the core institutional logic of the respective legislature.

Furthermore, the understanding of legislature provides scholars and researchers alike to decipher what actually goes on in the legislature and enrich the academic arena on the multiple causative elements responsible for the sudden, frequent or subtle change in MPs' behavior. As we explore the analytical submission made by Reuven (2010) on legislative behavior, it is vividly evident that legislative behavior is affected by candidate selection or reselection. Hence there is a direct correlation between these two elements because a legislature tends to be encouraged or discourage to change their behavior, attitudes, or actions in order to suit the party's interests and therefore facilitate their reselection or even, in some cases, promotion to a higher level under their party's platform or in an appointment they hold, representative of the party's causes.

The author also showed pathways in which legislative unity is compounded by cohesion and discipline (deemed democratization of candidate selection) and how these factors reinforce the propensity of MPs' behavior to be influenced, shaped, and altered. In Gandhi and Przeworski's (2007) analysis, they argue that even in single-party regimes or rather authoritarianist-peculiar democracy, parties' interaction is highly critical as they are in a functioning democracy. This is because mobilization, structuring debates, and setting up agendas for legislative discourse and lawmaking deliberations are highly controlled. It sets the pace for the clarity and swift passage of policy implementation in the legislatures; thus, MPs' behavior is also influenced.

In trying to understand this submission, one realizes that agenda-setting plays a huge role here as the institutional mechanisms set forth facilitate the behavioral alteration among MPs, hence forcing them to abide by the status-quo, which in one way or the other prevents the possibilities of dissents and uphold the strict roll-call order; hence the system prevails (Przeworski, 2008). To simplify this assertion, however, Paul Schuler et al. (2012) buttressed the idea that legislatures in this kind of systems tend to possess longevity in its operations, as it is incorporated into an authoritarian-like regime- thus, policy-making, access to resources, and information is routinely controlled and set up in such a way to favor the system.

A study by Josephine (2005) on legislatures in Central Europe also shows that the aforementioned analysis fit their legislative systems' operations because policy-making and institutional capacity is structured by the direct implication of partisan factor and legislature-executive relations. In another narrative that Crisp et al. (2012) made on Latin America's study, the party leaders have strict control over parliamentary agendas. Thus parties are deemed powerful, and that makes it difficult for MPs to act on their own when making speeches or taking legislative actions; this is a way, according to them, to curtail the possibilities of party crisis, dissent, and the likes; and to keep the party and its members undivided.

A similar narrative to this is of Downs (2012), where he explained that parties and MPs alike are forced to concur to citizens' demands by pressures felt from subnational-legislatures and how they also use 'digital democracy; the media' and information dissemination concerning citizens demands to be represented and their voices heard. This is a typical way to make the MPs aware that they are being watched/observed at other 'lower levels'; hence their behaviors are always in check, which serves as a tool to make them always conscious of their actions at the "national legislative chamber."

In the work of Audrey and Shugart (2014), they highlighted how critical the electoral institutions are on tuning legislative behavior. They argued that because of the tendency of MPs to seek re-election bids, they often dance to the electoral system's tunes, which is shaped by the MPs' tendency to gain party-based reputation simultaneously with that which they gain from the voters. Thus, it exposes the party's incentives and voters' incentives, which would then opportunistically be grasped by the individual MPs.

Furthermore, Hix et al. (2009) show that Members of European Parliament MEPs are chosen under different electoral and institutional rules in the European Parliament. This, in turn, shapes the behavior of MEPs because they focus on their career prospects inside the European Parliament; "there is also a tenuous connection between voters and MEPs, which explains why their behaviour is motivated by the belief that they can succeed in the Parliament only by relying on coalitions and the creation of parties within the Parliament's jurisdiction" (Hix et al., 2000: 10).

The above explains the assertion about the European Parliament having three types of MEPs, which are the early-careerists, who see the EU Parliament as a meaningful way to gain breakthrough to national politics; the seasoned politicians, who see the EU Parliament as an avenue for them stepping down from national politics; and the Brussels careerists, who majorly view the EU Parliament as the most suitable place for them to nurture and promote their careers. According to McKay (2011), in a bid to show how exogenous forces could influence MPs' behavior, explains how pressure groups, the media, and other external agents frequently tender or broadcast policy demands to these MPs.

In turn, they (MPs) become in conformity to sponsor such demand-containing bills in the Parliament. This factor shows how critical external forces could influence the behavior of MPs therein. Furthermore, it is crucial not to dislodge the importance of lawmaking in the legislative process and how these laws are being made come to fruition. Thus, Saiegh (2011) argues that voting behavior's huge uncertainty always influences legislative behavior during a resolution or lawmaking session, and the availability of resources that facilitate vote-buying is deemed the most significant cause of it.

This assertion explains in a broad sense how policy-making and agenda-setting correlates, but also how party discipline in legislatures may differ, which explains how legislative behavior is altered. To give a succinct analysis, therefore, the authors' research reveals how "the subsidiary position of 'vote- buying' and 'party sticks and carrots' exerts a strong impact on MPs' activities and the direction of policy enforcement measures in the legislature" (Saiegh, 2011: 13). Agenda setting in the legislature also affects MPs' behavior because of the institutional mechanisms that have been set up. Rasch (2011) explained how issues are being scheduled, time-table controlled and proposals generated, blockage of proposals, and the tendency to systematically set the pace on which proceedings in the parliamentary plenary would sail.

Legislative agenda settings tend to be strict in some cases, but in other cases, as exposed by the author, especially depending on how strict the party or government in power might be, the power to enforce obedience and sanctions on a dissenting MP whose actions goes contrary to the party norms, and or mechanisms by which influence gets gained maybe be intricately loose. For these reasons, therefore, MPs' own perceptions, interests, and impulses might override their parties' interests because of the drive to always seek personal interests achieved wholly. Be it as it may, an MP's tendency to get conscientious and aware about the consequences of his actions but, yet again, undertake a risky move shows how far MPs are willing to go when their behaviors are altered.

In a submission made by Mershon et al. (2011) on party switching, MPs in some cases use parties as vehicles to garner votes from the constituents, influence, or even security offices. Meaning, some politicians may switch their party affiliation to whatever expense, as long as their vested interests will be met, and this shows how legislative behavior could be highly conditioned; and remedies to this condition might be between minimum to zero because politicians are always in an arena where rules could according to them, be bent in order to achieve their goals.

Other institutional-related works of literature on legislative behavior encompass the following: party discipline and how the institution of the parliament empower party leaders to enforce discipline on dissenting MPs and members alike, which is basically centered on ensuring cohesion and unity of the party they operate (Kam, 2009); how legislative parties with the respective operations affect the behavior of MPs (Saalfeld, 2000); How political parties' competition affect legislative behavior (Strom, 1990); the role committees play on legislative behavior and how it alters operational outputs of MPs as they are aware of the delegated responsibilities that come with specific offices (Martin, 2011); Rules and procedural elements in the legislature and how both of these contribute to the control of legislative affairs and accompanying rewards and sanctions in the arena, where need be (Muller, 2002); legislative careering in mostly democratic legislatures and how this affects the behavior of MP.

Similarly, the scholars also explored studies from both macro-level and micro-level studies, while simultaneously including some additional research on term limits and proffering solutions to curtail these tendencies (MacKenzie, 2009; Kousser, 2006); how the concept of 'roles' directly induces a link to individual MPs with institutions they operate within. This means that the institution will be subjective because the individual craves to control it, which is ambitious, hence altering the individual MP (Andeweg, 2012). These aforementioned are but a few from an exhaustive literature list that emphasize the institutional factors that alter or affect legislative behavior. Therefore, the subsequent analysis will be focused on semi-institutional (institutional-individual) factors that affect the impacts on legislative behavior.

2.1.2. Semi-Institutional Analysis

Analysis on legislative behavior has expanded and centers a focus on the institutionally-motivated factors that tend to shape individual MPs' behavior and the mechanisms set up by institutions- elections, renomination, voting, etcetera- that drive hand-in-hand with MPs' own actions (interplay) hence producing a means through which behavioral patterns are controlled or influenced (Shugart et al., 2005).

From the foregoing, it is pertinent to explore works of literature that revolve around individual-institutional instigating elements; such as roll-call voting, party dissent, clientelism and affiliation to local cleavages, parliamentary questions, age and term limits, parliamentary speeches, and the likes, etcetera, and their role on legislative behavior, as this would aid in giving a broader understanding of the typologies of macro and micro-analysis; which are quintessential elements on the core concepts of institutional and individual autonomy, and finetuning the multidimensionality of this research therein (Kreppel, 2010). Best et al. (2000; 2012a & b) explored the legislative institution in terms of social relations and how it affected MPs' behavior.

They showed differences in relations between the 'insider-insider relations' and 'insider-outsider relations,' with the sheer antagonism that erodes within these spheres. Thus, the MPs manifest the quest for- competitive struggle for votes (how individual MPs under their parties' auspices mobilize to garner the support of the populace), antagonistic cooperation (the way how MPs compete amongst each other in the parliament during plenaries and sessions that concern the established status-quo on endogenous and exogenous grounds, and finally, the principal-agent relations (which is primarily concerned with how correlational the relationship is between the MPs and their constituents, especially on, before or after the possible discharge of duties).

Generally, this symbiotic relationship means that legislative behavior is susceptible to influence from internal and external factors that motivate action. One of the most critical topics in comparative politics that has been debated is the relationship between legislative behavior and the

electoral system. Andre and Shugart (2014) argue that the electoral system, in one way or the other, influences or shapes the behavior of MPs, thereby driving them instead to either strengthen or weaken the means through which they cultivate personal reputation to the detriment of their political parties.

They further examined how electoral institutions' 'mechanical effects' drive individual MPs into acting the way they do and push to garner personal votes. Similarly, they studied the so-called psychological effects of electoral institutions and observed how they also translated into motivational factors in driving individual MPs to initiate particular legislation, constituency affairs, and divorcing/detaching oneself with party discipline. The results indicate that the political system has a significant influence on legislative action because legislative candidates are constantly making calculations ranging from the selective advantages that will accrue upon victory, as announced by party officials, to the question of inclusion or re-representation of some important party positions.

In a similar review to this premise, Andeweg et al.'s (2010) study of the Dutch Parliament showed how party discipline and cohesion played significant roles and how there is apparent homogeneity, cooperation, and loyalty amongst members of parliament; in any case, where dissenting is likely, the members who chose to do so still avoid tiptoeing the party line in public, but discreetly; because they subscribe to the party leadership's position vehemently or a majority of the members make this element possible, which makes dissenting challenging and impossible.

Looking at the work of Audrey et al. (2012), it would be noted that MPs and political parties use the electoral institution in their best interest in order to garner support from the voters, as they are aware of the efficacy of the voters' perception on their activities in the legislative chamber (even if they are not very knowledgeable on the MPs' activities, they tend to follow up specific crucial committee activities that affect the community directly or indirectly). Diermeier et al. (2011) highlighted the importance of the social choice theory, structured-induced equilibrium theory, and the non-cooperative theory with their various pros and cons and how they influence MPs' behavioral patterns in legislative politics.

The legislature's political parties are not superficial; hence they are compactly institutionalized because they wield structures that command functions in the most typical hierarchical order. Thus, this factor tends to influence legislative behavior as member MPs will be in one way or the other bound by the rules governing the party organization and functions.

Yildirim et al. (2019), using Turkey's closed-list Proportional Representation system (PR), stated that "representatives' parliamentary performance, such as activeness and issue concentration", has a direct impact on the possibility of members being renominated or promoted, as it also has a significant impact on not only the person making the input, but also the party (Yildirim, 2019: 4); However, a first step in achieving this assertion is to "penalize all electorally

secure incumbents who prefer parliamentary power by private members' bills" (Yildirim, 2019: 15).

Koop et al. (2011) also assert that candidates or MPs prioritize those who tend to play higher roles in determining their career prospects. Here, it means that the behavior of MP is shaped by the calculative logic of the fact that when they serve the people who vote them into office, especially in a presidential or parliamentary democracy, they somewhat have the mindset about the term limit being extended further and renominated, no matter how authoritarian party leadership's rule is.

Another close narrative to the aforementioned is the argument made by Louwse et al. (2016) about the tendency for MPs to act in various ways deemed personalized for a couple of reasons (Fernandes, 2017; Prokosch, 2012; Shomer, 2009). This premise supports Saward's (2010) assertion that MPs always align themselves to the specific cultural repertoire that shapes their routes to getting reelected. Thus, they suggest that MPs' behavior should be conditioned to resist any endogenous or exogenous changes, and also remain neutral in their dealing, however much their cravings for re-election bidding is.

Briefly, it is evident that based on the aforementioned analysis, legislative behavior is conditioned by electoral rules in the quest for political representation. In short, this symptomatic with the argument made by Depau et al. (2009) about the availability of district magnitudes which are available to voters, and hence create better opportunities for MPs to take advantage of, dive in, and cultivate personal reputation with voters in a bid to garner support and votes for re-election into office. Caplan et al. (2020) also emphasized an MP's position affecting the likelihood of them raising local issues during plenaries; this is after rigorously examining the Nunatsiavut Assembly in Canada, which showed evidence that this pattern is usually undertaken in order to clinch the cleavage-relationship they so desire and hence get the possibilities of being reelected.

MPs' or candidates' attributes also contribute to their local communities' know-how and have significant political implications, thus attracting more personal votes (Tavits, 2009). Sequel to this tendency, therefore, the author noted that there is a possibility for MPs to act individualistic and breakaway from the party because of their career goals and the fact that they have garnered a huge number of supporters from their local area/constituency; in other words, local-level experience in the legislature is a tool highly significant to ensure an MP being according to the author, a 'maverick' in the parliament (Tavits, 2009).

As seen in the analysis brought forth by Martin (2011) on parliamentary questions, the author argues that individual MPs' role orientation could be measured by the type of question they deliver on the parliamentary floor. Thus, these questions could be geared towards local, national, or even

international interests and policy concerns; mainly, the MP's orientation would always, according to the author, become apparent when critically examined and the behavior understood.

Members of parliament often look for opportunities to "engage in non-legislative events such as legislative speeches and parliamentary questions in order to influence government policies directly or indirectly" (Green-Padersen, 2010: 7). In another summation, Bachtiger (2005) explores the strategic partisan rhetoric existent within the legislature and how this directly influences MPs' behavior. This assertion is in line with the idea that speeches are mere legislative debates because they do not have any strong policy implication, but rather an avenue for an open competition to meet several vested interests between the government and the opposition (Brennan et al., 1993: 447).

Moving on, Vliegthart and Walgrave (2011), in their analysis, showed that MPs are always determined to ponder on issues that their party attaches more attention to that will eventually spur up media attention. MPs from opposing parties and or governments get some ideas and tools from the media (Vliegthart, 2016). By so doing, therefore, their behavior is always affected and affixed in ways that they are always calculative of their immediate environment and the results of what their actions might yield, which in order words will lead to them gaining more momentum on the party's scene as well as increase their chances of being renominated. As legislative research expands further, various scholars have brought forward analysis that showcases how legislative behavior is affected; hence, MPs act accordingly.

For instance, "MPs in party-centered regimes use regular legislative practices to increase their visibility and re-election prospects" (Fernandes et al., 2017). Meserve (2009) conducted a related analysis focusing on "political ambition and legislative actions in the European Parliament (EP)," in which they examined "MEPs' roll-call voting behavior during the EP's fifth session (1999–2004) using a random-effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior in both individual MEPs and relevant roll-call votes" (Meserve, 2009: 12). Members of the European Parliament MEPs either advance inside the European Parliament or return to their home country to hold office.

They contend that these two distinct objectives have an impact on legislative action. The authors stress that "MEPs aspiring to domestic professions in their home states often vote against party leaderships and reject legislation that expands supranational institutions' widespread influence" (Meserve, 2009: 13). They demonstrate how their theory influenced MEPs' legislative conducts and voting decisions by examining people, domestic party affiliation, and national level variables. They analyze that "politicians (here MPs) are ambitious. Some MPs aspire to remain in their political office as members for more than one term" (Meserve, 2009: 13), while others advance to other offices. These career ambitions conditions legislative behavior while also simultaneously affecting the choices made when lawmaking.

MPs who are aware that the leadership of the party they belong to is solely responsible for candidate reselection/nomination resorted to rather raising constituency-related issues as mere wordings on the parliamentary floor than actually promoting practical development issues on the respective constituencies; this is a tactic used to captivate the leadership of the party so that their renomination would be deemed somewhat guaranteed, as they bring up issues that label the party as being the forebearer of importantly critical issues.

In the European Parliament, too, speeches are opportunistic tools that enhance good records for candidates and their parties, which in other words aid in fostering candidates' re-election bids. Besides, MPs will always engage in personalized parliamentary activities whether they are elected on the preference votes or not, thus giving the conclusion about 'activity' rather determining 'list position.' Simply put, the political agenda, as theorized by Bulut (2017), will always be driven by clientelism and legislative competition. Hence MPs always use floor time to achieve their goals (Cifci & Yildirim, 2017; Slapin & Proksch, 2010; Louwerse & Otjes, 2016; Cox, 2006; Van Vonna et al., 2012).

Similar researches on the effects of legislative speech on the behavior of the legislature could be referenced to the work of Bulut (2020), where they examined parliamentary speech in Turkey and found that, in contrast to the focus put on "the position of the party and individual opposition on speechmaking activity and processes in mostly single-member districts (SMD)" (Bulut, 2020: 3), "electoral vulnerability" of the MPs paves the way for the latter to mobilize using personal efforts to garner their constituents' support thereby leading to them getting approval from the party leadership once they prevail.

Hence, the more an individual legislature is electorally vulnerable, the more likely they will delve into having more constituency-related speeches to garner momentum for themselves and increase their re-election possibilities thereafter. Therefore, it is paramount to say legislative behavior is always shaped by elements posing influence on the norms for operation in legislative affairs. These activities may range from MPs' behavior getting influenced with the thought of garnering public image, role orientation (public service), advocacy policy priorities, high level of partisanship; these explain why party leadership tends to choose members into its caucus or for representation, as they have gained some substantial amount of public prominence (Gallagher et al., 1997).

More so, Andre et al. (2015) analyzed the European systems with the most flexible-list systems. Their observation pinpointed that party leaderships tend to reward MPs whose votes and electorates' preference garner the highest, thus enabling their ranking file in the party to be more prioritized. Thus, "MPs' own efforts to achieve national prominence always result in their re-election on the basis of the party's agenda", resulting in heightening their ranks thereafter; this behavioral

pattern is vividly symptomatic of how MPs could calculate their actions in the legislature, which gives an outcome for it (Andre, 2015: 2).

Sequel to the aforementioned, it would be noted that legislative behavior is influenced in many ways because the institutional and semi-institutional settings pave the way for these actions to be calculated, altered, and or even other measures to be developed. Other related literature on the personalistic tendencies borders on how diversity, especially in terms of electorates' socioeconomic composition and size, generally affects MPs' behavior. David et al. (2019) showed in a recent publication how this effect impacts the Australian Senate, where those from quite more diverse and expanded socioeconomic districts push for more bills to be passed in the parliament- and are very active- compared to those with smaller district sizes, who are in other words relatively ineffective.

Similarly, Hajek (2019), while analyzing the Czech Republic Parliament, suggests that MPs' age- in terms of longevity of stay and experience in the Parliament- affects MPs' legislative behavior during the discharge of their duties. Thus, the more they stay in the legislative system, the more intuitive speeches and strategic proposals they are likely to make. However, they also justified MPs' tenure to negatively impact MPs' behavior because they may have a lesser coherent policy implementation ability and plan, as they would be more focused on stretching further their tenures by getting voted.

Poole et al. (2011) provided an overview of how spatial properties of voting and other political theories could be investigated. They highlight that statistical methods could be adopted to measure MPs' choices and judgment, thereby permitting the extraction of the latent or abstract phases on which elements (subject/object) could be evaluated. Although this system is not widely used because of the hefty nature of figurative data and expertise required to get it done, it could be an effective tool for analyzing the underlying pattern of MPs' preference and how it affects their behavior.

However, this method is widely used in the US and mainly for comparative purposes in legislative studies. In another study of the US Congress, using religion/ideology (even though there has not been exhaustive literature on this issue) as the centerpiece of the research, Guth et al. (2005) showed how various religious sects (Christianity primarily) is distributed between groups (race and ethnic dimensions) and how it affects the behavior of Congress members, as well as how they use it to lobby groups while or before making an observation or policy-related speech on the parliamentary floor; there is, however not an exhaustive list of literature that dwells on this topic, lest even develop to expand on it.

Similarly, Slapin et al. (2008; 2012) emphasize how technological advancement has helped scholars and researchers use 'Words as Data.' This means that textual data produced in the legislature

could now be stored for research or comparative studies in legislatures, thus enabling the storage, use, and analysis of informational trends as well as predictability of these data representation on the behavior of MPs. According to the scholars, this will enable researchers to have questions such as party political manifestoes, policy-making, and the incursive effects on legislative behavior effectively answered.

In fact, the consistency of information, as well as whether this information change over time as a result of elections or other factors, is prime because, as Klingemann et al. (2006) argue, it deciphers the codes underlined within parties' manifestoes by hand-coding every one of them to create a log of data for substantive research of MPs policy predications, and where necessary, parliamentary speeches (Procksch, 2006; Bemauer, 2009; Klemmensen, 2007).

2.1.3. Non-Institutional Factors

2.1.3.1. Gender dimension

This section will analyze a few works of literature that focus on those factors not intertwined with institutional elements that affect legislative behavior but rather that which deals with gender— an analysis of gender representation will be made. Women's presence in government has increased sporadically in recent years, while gender representation as a debate has gained steady traction. "Women's representation in legislatures, both national and state-level legislatures, is growing globally" (Taylor, 2014: 4).

This author holds that "women/female MPs act differently from their male counterparts when they get into the legislative arena; as a result, they are more inclined than their male peers to represent women's needs" (Taylor, 2014: 5). More so, given the increase of female legislative representation worldwide, they still hold far lower than half the parliamentary chambers' seats than their male counterparts (Taylor, 2014: 5). Kittilson (2005; 2006) argued that in most European Parliaments, parties promote female MPs' representation and election.

These parties (left parties), according to the author, adopted the quota rule system where women will also be opportune to represent no matter what, and this prevents them from getting sidelined in the electoral, legislative, and representation system wholly; this system manifested a contagion. This factor has also led other parties to get 'pressured' and hence follow suit. Additionally, the scholars concluded that as the proportion of women in parliament grew, they became more integrated and equitable in parliamentary affairs, passing more laws to "respect women's needs than their male counterparts" (Krook, 2009; Matland et al., 1996).

Furthermore, other studies show that women do more in terms of constituency service fulfillment than do their male counterparts because they receive more requests directly from constituents, pay more attention, and also offer to help in areas of personal needs of their constituents than their male counterparts (Thomas, 1992; Richardson et al., 1995; Saint-Germain et al., 2008). Other scholars focused on women's attitude and the fact that they have more tendencies to initiate women-related bills such as women's rights that range from health, gender quality, children, protection from violence and the likes, and the family. This submission demonstrates that "women are more likely than men to have the impulse to concentrate on social security and community" (McDonald and O'Brien, 2011; Delvin et al., 2008).

Similarly, other researchers observe that "women are more likely than men to propose bills connected with historically feminine issues, such as healthcare, education, health, and the world in general" (Swers, 2005; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). It is critical to note that women's interests are not limited to legislative participation; rather, it is necessary to highlight the factors that influence women's behavior when legislating and or how women representation in parliaments tends to affect their male counterparts, thus paving the way for policies to be implemented that benefit women.

Examining the Argentinian Parliament, Htun et al. (2013) noted that when women represented more share of the parliamentary seats, there are "more women's rights bills enacted in parliament and women are more concerned with problems affecting them than their male counterparts" (Htun, 2013: 17). That being said, a very great number of these bills were either not passed or declined because they still continually get marginalized, which in other words, leads to a blow on their being able to display political efficacy thereafter.

Some of the reasons why women clamor for their interests to be represented, according to Beckwith (2011), could basically be pinpointed on the women's opportunity to improve their capabilities as well as improving their opportunities in life equal to their male counterparts and be allowed the full right of representation in leadership affairs. In a recent study, Bäck et al. (2019) argued in their analysis that women make lesser parliamentary speeches because their behavior is attuned by the so-called incongruity theory, which means that gender stereotypes play a dominant role.

Furthermore, they argue that women tend not to take part in especially debates that are majorly referred "masculine," and thus, they remain mute for their male counterparts to take on most topics. Simply put, the author argues that the possibility of women taking on the parliamentary floor to make a speech is far lesser, mainly when they belong to so-called female-dominated political parties, which makes their behavior affected by the so-called 'order of the day' and *modus operandi*.

Sequel to the aforementioned, some factors operate simultaneously with women's representation, such as representation in Muslim majority countries. Bulut's (2020) study on Muslim-

majority country, Turkey, showed the direct implication of politicization of religion (politicization of Islam by the ruling AKP party's politicians rather than Islam itself, or even regional-based religiosity as the author posits) directly affects women's representation in legislative affairs, which brings about lesser feminist-related bills to be drafted, thus posing negative impacts on their interests being represented.

Research on gender-related issues is continually gaining strands within the arena of legislative politics, so there are high expectations that the field will further be enriched for the steady development of the field in the future. Finally, this section has been able to rigorously highlight the factors responsible for shaping legislative behavior- Institutional and Non-institutional- and it has been made clear on which dimensions they align to, in order to get a clearer insight on how the behavior of MPs is affected before and during the legislative process.

2.2. Representation

The core of every stable and consolidated democracy is representation. Representation seeks to infuse itself into lawmaking, where every individual in the society tends to be represented by proxy, that is, by elected officials/representatives consolidated by the will of the people in primarily organized elections in a democratic setting. Thus, daunting issues of effectively representing- squarely- the entirety of a diverse group by elected representatives come to play, which in other words, directly affects the element shaping citizens' trust in their representatives. Additionally, this aspect pervades the majority-minority ratio provision, in which the majority is arbitrarily represented at the detriment of the minority and vice versa (Hayes, 2016: 1).

One of the most revered scholars of representation in democratic studies is Hannah Pitkins (1967). She theorized expansively in-depth literature on representation and developed mechanisms for understanding the phases involved in representing societies. In her work, she developed four central conceptions associated with the idea of representation and ensured that justice was done with all of those analyses exhaustively. Although these conceptions are well articulated and widely cited, many contexts fail to put them into practice because other scholars tend to proffer different alternatives by adopting other dimensions of representation itself to apply their specific contexts.

Representation could be referred to as an effort made by administrators to ensure that mediums are developed to pave the way for "a more inclusive, deliberative and engaged relationship with the masses" (McAteer et al., 2004: 133). Similarly, Heywood (2002) argued that representation reflects a 'pact' whereby individuals take on the stance- by means of principle and agreement- to represent a larger group of people in capacities of organizational politics (Heywood, 2002: 224). Hence, it is possible to uphold that representation has been carried out effectively only when there is feasibility in the engagement and consultation at the local units by the so-called leaders representing them at the helm of affairs. More so, the concept of representation could be questionable when issues

regarding how the masses are represented or what- factor/section- that needs to be represented are 'not fulfilled or ignored.'

Similarly, the best ways to organize and create relations between the populace and representatives- in terms of MPs and Masses- is by establishing electoral institutions that will forestall elections to determine who gets chosen to represent the divergent voices existent from within the grassroots (Pitkin, 1967: 2). Therefore, as representation is the pinnacle to democracy, a qualitative representation mostly depends on the active and high level of accountability and responsiveness of representatives at the helm of affairs (Bühlmann et al., 2010: 4). In other words, the moral of equality for all should be adhered to, the citizens' voices should be heard, and their preference clamored for adequately. As Pitkin (1967) rightly puts it, representatives will be put to power based on their possibilities of guaranteeing the interests of the citizens.

Therefore, Pitkin (1967) notes that other scholars have always had "flash-bulb photographs of the structure taken from different angles" (Pitkin, 1967: 10). This hefty quote means that one must understand the context in which they are trying to contextualize the concept of representation to get a clearer picture of what it truly means. Hence, the concept of representation could be miscalculated and heavily constrained in its applicability, especially in modern political dispensation.

2.2.1. Types of Representation

Pitkin (1967), in her exhaustive study, provided four patterns/dimensions of representation with multifaceted outlooks: the formalistic view, the symbolic view, the descriptive view, and the substantive view of representation. These different approaches tend to be integrated into a whole structure of conceptual understanding.

2.2.1.1. Formalistic/Formal Representation

In this form of representation, according to Pitkin (1967), rules and regulations driven by the formally set up institutions in a society are what make the toll and shape of representation. According to her, this type of activity is defined by the very nature of the formal arrangement that tends to reflect that people are being "acted for by a representative" or even an active symbol that corresponds to (an embodiment) what it represents. She also explains the exquisite notion of "conduct of a representative qua representative," which portrays acting and reflection of one's actions.

In view of other scholar's theorizing on the aforementioned fragment, the claim that interest groups play "significant roles in engendering intrinsic democratic modeling perspectives" (Squires, 2000; Young, 1999; Mansbridge, 1999). Similarly, these scholars believe that women in leadership positions ought to use their capacities to speak out for other women- effectively representing them- because of their shared identity of being the same gender. More so, these scholars note that since

women's overarching identities could be more diverse to the extent of entrenching issues such as personality types and racial inclination, they (women) could all come together and share ideas that would be of intrinsic values to the decision-making body in any establishment they are found within.

Pitkin's (1967) formalistic view of representation is further segmented into two, which are the "authorization" and "accountability" clauses. The former (Authorization) denotes representatives' being able to secure their statuses as representers or delegates. Here, the person in question secures power through organized elections and then is able to impose his/her authority (on the very same people who uplifted them onto that position) because of the existing (probably democratic) system. Although the delegate is transparently elected, the questioning of his/her actions- on the people- cannot always be directly triggered, and neither will a question be posed on "why" they behave the way they do.

The latter (accountability), on the other hand, tends to portray how the representative is questioned by the constituents- meaning, they are answerable to their actions- and sanctions imposed when the representatives do not act per the wishes of the constituents who elected them into power, or worst still, decline to vote for the representative in the next elections. One thing worthy of note is that, actions are not consequentially sanctionable in the former (authorization), but every action is consequentially sanctionable and paramount in the latter (accountability).

As the focus on representation centered towards nation-states' stances on accountability and authorization diminished, it continued to lose hedge because of the domestic and international transformations the world over (Warren et al., 2004). Hence non-governmental and international actors can now play the role of catering to the plight of communities even within the nation-state (authorization and accountability) instead of limiting the crux of representativeness on solely elected individuals within a given state. This modern factor is often seen in the present-day dispensation, as non-state actors like the United Nations (UN), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), are dwelled with the obligations to represent and act capacitively for the people.

2.2.1.2. Symbolic Representation

Pitkin (1967) refers to this view of representation as that which encapsulates the leaders' own ability to represent and strictly symbolize their stance on representing their constituents. She further says that what matters is not just the symbol entirely, but "its power to evoke feelings or attitudes" (Pitkin, 1967: 97). Apparently, symbols are not just about whom the person represents or what the representer does, but what people being represented perceive of the representer's actions and how symbolically positive the represented validates the representer's actions in its entirety.

Similarly, Wahlke (1971) sees symbolic representation as a great ideal because of the quality of policy responsiveness by the representer compared to other forms of representation, as it is concerned about how the people see (the efficiency of) their representatives. Conceptualizing representation universally has sought to yield a vast conundrum among a group of scholars on how to adopt a unitary definition for the term. Hence, some see the term as being synonymous with descriptive representation, as it quests for a representative's "standing for" or "representing for" someone or something abstract (Pitkin, 1967; Carroll, 2004; Barker, 2006).

Others see the term (symbolic representation) as the result or effect of women's presence or participation in the parliament, scrutinizing the body's (legislature) legitimacy, thus prompting both men and women (positively), hence increasing the participation of women in the parliamentary affairs of their societies (Childs, 2004; Lawless, 2004; Reingold, 2000). Similar to this theorization is that of Sapiro (1981), who sees the concept of symbolic representation as the strong effect women's presence plays on the perception of voters in the very political arena that is- naturally- deemed a 'domain for men.' The aforementioned expositions could be directly linked to the cultural definitions that explain representation and representativeness in a public (political) domain where women representation is not an accustomed culture; neither is it (the election of female officials) a "principle" being practiced.

More so, recent studies have shown varying distinctions between the importance of having female representatives in administrative affairs and the symbolic significance they may pose on constituents' perception and even societies at large. Hence, the more women there are in the political process (as representatives), the more signals are sent to other women regarding 'participation' in societal decision-making affairs. Meaning, they are also allowed to participate in politics, and "participation is open to all citizens irrespective of gender or identity," and women will gradually become more comfortable going outside the realm of the household and participating in what concerns society large (Childs, 2004: 3).

Therefore, the importance of women's participation in politics is always attributed to the fact that more women need to get elected in the political process, despite the saying that "men could also be mandated- parochially- to represent women's interest." Thus, the participation of women at the elite levels means that policy implementation drives would be balanced and have a dynamic impact on the constituency as many others are encouraged to participate and get involved holistically (Lawless, 2004: 11).

Furthermore, Symbolic representation has resonated an enormous feeling of minority groups' having great regard for government and trust, political efficacy, participation, interest in political affairs, and the likes (Abramson, 1972). Therefore, attitudinal gaps between the represented and representatives have been proven to get relieved in situations of optimum symbolic representation. In other words, the level of trust yielding between representatives and those deemed "minority

groups" has considerably become better when these "minority groups" get represented descriptively (Hero et al., 1995).

2.2.1.3. Descriptive Representation

The capacity of representatives' representation of their constituents (to stand for) and share various critical features such as race, ethnicity, gender, and religion is what is deemed as descriptive representation. Hence, this situation of mirroring or reflecting the represented by the representative (s) is prime to the concept of descriptive representation (Kurebawa, 2015: 52). One of the core principles of this view is that the "legislatures are meant to be the exact portrait of the people they represent" (Pitkin, 1967: 61).

Similarly, Norris (1993) argued about the representation of women in politics. In the author's summation, they argued that in order to achieve descriptive representation, women who tend to be part of the political spectrum should not be evaluated in terms of performance regarding what they do, but rather how many there are (group representatives) participating in the political spectrum. This factor may lead to the concept of social and functional representation, which brings about the correspondence to the essential elements warranting the thriving of the descriptive model (race, ethnicity, gender, and class representation) (Norris, 1993: 3).

Therefore, as descriptive representation is about the resourceful stratification of social cleavages in society, assessing the number of women participating in politics comes to the core, not what the women- per se- say or mention regarding policies while in office. In descriptive representation, elected representatives tend to be policy-responsive to the constituents they share similar characteristics and ideals with, and hence they construct socially viable policies because of empathy (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Young, 1990).

Several works of literature have been exhaustively researched on representation, and most importantly, substantive and descriptive representation, which have had their various core discussion points on different levels (with prime focus laid on minority groups) ranging from race, gender, and ethnic cleavages. Here, the crux to the concept is "minority empowerment" (Bühlmann et al., 2015: 2). This connotation vividly explains that the reflection of the minority in part- by having someone represent them in government administrative affairs- mirrors the very essence to which the representative body was set up, enabling every individual's interest to be represented and heard in government. It is essential when the representatives' organ's composition reflects the entire diverse community.

Similarly, Pitkins (1967) highlights that descriptive representation provides opportunities for historically marginalized people to practice their communities' administrative affairs. This assertion

goes as far as encapsulating women into politics because they have been historically marginalized in administrative affairs. More so, in order that the concept does not get restricted to academic knowledge, Kurebawa (2016) argues that it is also backed up with stimulants that gear praxis for participation. Going by this assertion, it would be noted that the participation of all is holistically welcome in this pattern of representation, leading to a "government solution that enables demographics to be adequately represented" in politics; when this is achieved, it becomes what the author regards as ideal and reality (Kurebawa, 2016: 52).

In another submission, Williams (1998) argues that the conditioning of fair representation is determined by the degree of consciousness formed via the trust existing between the representative and represented. Therefore, for this factor to thrive, there has to be confidence-building between those who are represented and those who represent, which unequivocally cements the trust between the parties. Similarly, three factors tend to explain the positive sides of the descriptive clause further empirically- firstly, belonging to a common social background tends to improve the communication link between the representatives and the represented (Mansbridge, 1999).

Secondly, 'identity' tends to likely shape people's voting choices than ideology, i.e., ethnicity and gender. Thirdly, as a context to the inclusion and involvement of every discriminated minority in the society is seemingly getting higher, descriptive representation aids in stabilizing the institutionalized political structure in order that every unit will be granted representation. These factors, put together, culminates in fostering greater political participation amongst minority groups/representatives, bolster interests in political and social affairs, and also optimally prevent the likelihood of violence and violent conflicts (Campbell, 2007; Howell, 1988; Cain, 1992).

In another study on women's substantive representation in Argentina and Chile, the "impact" of women in descriptive representation- those representing other women in politics/administration- tends to show a positive effect on the likelihood of women advancing other women's interests or gender-related issues than their male counterparts. It is so because the symbolic presence they possess gears them to further the interest of others like them in order to foster greater possibilities of participation of the female gender in politics (Susan, 2011: 1).

There have also been several arguments that descriptive representation does not necessarily yield a substantive representation outcome. While some claim that because the quality of a demographic may affect the outcome of policy deliberation processes, others claim that exaggerating the issue of heterogeneity on groups' capacities to have representatives at the core to get represented may erode the possibilities of legislators' practical and altruistic actions, unity, and making policies for all (nation) because of the demographic unit-focused prime factor (Phillips, 1995).

More so, existing works of literature on women's descriptive and substantive representation- the former being their presence in legislatures and the latter being the promotion of women's interests- highlighted three different perspectives as to their participation and outcome in representative administration. Thus, it goes from their proportional representation (critical mass), attitudinal/individual factors (ideology in terms of feminism), and finally, contextual-institutional factors (which range from the support they garner within the institutional setup they thrive in, or instead, from their very own organizational composition and support garnered from public opinion) (Dahlerup, 2006: 2).

Institutional factors play considerable roles in affecting representative actions, which in other words play stark roles on the future electability of a female representative or that person who tend to push for the sponsoring of bills attributed to a specific group, constituency, or sector (March, 2005: 1). This factor could be attributed mainly to "informal rules and procedures that structure conduct" and shapes the dynamics of the broader institutional framework in operation (Thelen et al., 1992: 4). Exemplary of this is, when a 'female' representative frequently proposes bills related to gender issues but which are incoherent with the very political party's guidelines they belong to, it leads to their deposition and non-electability in the future because the system itself has its fundamentals therein.

Be it as it may, the importance of descriptive representation is to ensure that demographics are adequately represented- especially the disproportionately marginalized minorities- in the policy implementation process. This may cause two impacts: one being the constituencies' adequate political engagement in the policy-making process. The second is whether the representatives "make positive impacts" when they appear on the legislative floor to make legislation for the constituencies they represent (Lawless, 2004; Swain, 1993).

Despite some scholars' appraisals on the descriptive representation's tendency to experience success in heterogenic societies (having different races, genders, ethnicities, and religious denominations) especially when choosing representatives, others claim that it may cause the selection of unqualified people to act in capacities of representatives in the long-run, which may yield inconsistent policies and bleak plan of actions for communities that tend to adopt this kind of systematic approach. Hence, rather than getting a positive outcome consistent with the planned projects, negative outcomes set in inevitably (Kymlicka, 2002).

Lastly, Pitkin (1967) noted that descriptive representation is critically vital in aspects where it might be applied as a form of a "fundamental formula" that seeks to represent various electorates' divisions in order to achieve a "mathematical exactness" in the legislative arm of government (Pitkin, 1967: 62). Policy responsiveness in this form of representation is prime; however, it depends on the degree to which the representatives can implement policies that tally with the demands of the people they represent.

2.2.1.4. Substantive Representation

Legislators' acting in the interest of the people they represent in a way that encapsulates all the existing ideals and policy mandates they had promised, simultaneously with a high level of responsiveness, is what, according to Pitkin (1967), substantive representation stands for. While she upholds the idea that the nexus of the term "representation" is substantive representation, others argue that its priorities may be an issue when the issue is brought to fore. Some hold that the constituents have little knowledge about the coherent policy they want the representatives to implement, and the representatives themselves are foresightless on the specific policy they should implement in order that the citizens' plights will be met (Wahlke, 1971).

Notwithstanding, argue that representatives' being able to be responsive is prime to representation. Furthermore, some scholars looked at substantive representation from an angle of measuring the propensity of policy responsiveness' impact on public opinion, with a more stringent focus on race and gender (Reingold, 2000; Bullock, 1995). More so, some other studies highlighted their point of argument on substantive representation using "women's substantive representation" as a medium to differ from what Pitkin had argued about representation being "an act for" and also "in the interest of" constituents (Pitkin, 1967: 112). Thus, the representative serves in the community's interest irrespective of any physical characteristic that may cause a hindrance to their behavior while legislating.

Women's representation is rigorously championed by feminist theorists who clamor for the neutralization of a 'political space dominated by the patriarchal nature of men' by making it accessible to women to participate in politics and represent other women in the decision-making bodies of their lands. Hence, the issue of women's representation has failed to be given a traditional concept that will suit the real meaning of what it truly is, which is why famous scholars like Philips (1995) argued that "there is not a definite empirical explanation or even plausibility" as regards women's representation in politics.

Despite women having a shared belief, they may end up not organizing themselves on a representative political level. Phillips argues that women should be present in politics in order for their varied aspirations to be met (Phillips, 1995: 5). Furthermore, she continues that women always have the distinctive "groupness" inherent in them, which explains why descriptive and substantive representation is non-detachable in political discourse. Inclusively, she made the distinction between "politics of ideas" and "politics of presence" (Phillips, 1995: 25). In a bid to provide a succinct analysis, the distinction between the aforementioned concepts is that the former is formal-representative oriented, and the latter is identity.

Thus, she concludes in her theory that "ideas" are non-detachable elements from a group of people- identifying as the same- it represents. The crux of substantive representation is the symbolism reflected by the representative of a group, thereby leading to the recognition of the group being represented in political affairs. Phillips (1995) also reiterated that a fairer system could be developed when there is a strict relationship between "ideas and presence," which leads to optimal representation.

Finally, as women's presence in politics leads to men having their campaign agendas/manifestoes during election voice out women issues to appeal to the women voters, one cannot ignore the fact that women in politics who have political offices tend to stand as a reflection of other women in the arena. Thus, identifying the system and making sure that the system favors their interests make them get more possibilities of being incorporated into the political affairs of their various communities, as they have been for years left out or excluded from participating (Burrell, 1996). By and large, substantive representation is an extension of a "functional" descriptive representation in any given situation therewith.

2.3. Determinants of Legislative behavior in Nigeria

2.3.1. Prebendalism

Rent-seeking practices are highly evident in the National Assembly, and this undermines the frail democratization the nation has continually been grappled with (Demarest, 2020). The author also posits that despite the reemergence of democratically installed parliaments in the Republic, so-called rubber-stamping practices amongst politicians and MPs alike are prevalent. Therefore, development is usually stalled because of this recurring trend in the nation's polity, and thus every serving or aspiring-to-serve MPs are more often than not interested in coming into the system to feed their vested interests and siphon public funds for their private use. However, Joseph coined the term "prebendalism" in 1987 to refer to "the prevalent political practice in Nigeria that allows public office holders to control rent (prebends) by unlawfully manipulating the mechanism for their personal use" (Demarest, 2020: 6).

More so, Collord (2018) attached prebendalism to MPs' ability to indulge in clientelism if they can control resources that are, in other words, elements galvanizing them of becoming patrons as they so desire. This clientelist politics that goes on between the MPs and their local constituents results in 'client-patronage network politics,' which, in turn, paves the way for intra-elite clientelism, and so the trend continues. Barkan et al. (2009) advocate for democratic strengthening to be 'crowded or rather crushed' to attain a sustainable democratic system and eliminate prebendalism in its entire course.

2.4.2. Religion

According to Pearson et al. (2009), "religious institutions are critical in shaping an individual's political socialization" (Pearson, 2009: 6). The authors argue that religious groups exert control on their members' political actions and, in some cases, mold their political views on issues pertaining to the political system through indoctrination. For instance, in Nigeria, political leadership conflicts exist between Muslims and Christians, and in the eastern part of the country, a political leadership conflict exists between Catholics and Protestants. Questions such as whether abortion or same-sex marriages, or how the religious affiliation of someone affects their voting, and other range of questions are asked and reviewed regarding how religion plays a critical role in influencing political/legislative behavior (D'Antonio, 2004; Broadway, 2004).

Religion is a massive player in the Nigerian society and even plays significant roles in shaping peoples' ideas and choices while making decisions, even while voting, because it could be a significant cleavage-element to garner support from the masses by most politicians. It could be a unifying and disunifying factor in the nation's polity. Pearson et al. (2009) cite how some religious groups in the USA, through a political party, vehemently vie to prevent the presidency's office's occupation by a Catholic. Hence, when making a law proposal, an MP is sensitive to religious matters and is guided by his religious indoctrination's understanding or beliefs.

2.4.3. Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism

Numerous authors, including Heywood (2007) and Udebunu (2011), assert that "multiculturalism encompasses the idea of national identity; therefore, it takes into account the coexistence of various cultural communities in a given society" (Udebunu, 2011: 3). Wong (2006; quoted in Udebunu 2011) states that multiculturalism refers to the coexistence of different societies without one being superior to another. Ekano (2006) describes how, with a focus on Nigeria, "In 1914, when the Northern and Southern protectorates were united, the British colonial government imposed the Nigerian socio-political system. This single British act brought together a diverse range of national and cultural communities, who had previously achieved divergent degrees of political and economic growth" (Ekano, 2006: 4).

These ethnic and cultural "entities of distinct and tragically unrelated cultural, traditional, and historical origins were combined to create a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-national community" (Ekano, 2006: 4). According to Shively (2003: 62), this scheme was designed to accommodate "British colonial imperialistic interests, which were mostly for the administrative convenience of Nigeria as a colony" (Shively, 2003: 36). Ifeyinwa (2002) argues that the British colonial illegitimate integration of different nationalities as one nation called "Nigeria," who did not

conceive the aspiration of becoming a single entity, further paved the way for starkly internal divisions.

Precisely put, the colonial introduction of several constitutional measures of the principle of divide and rule, has until this day, stoked the political behavior of many in the country. This colonial act inevitably created a "climate of mutual mistrust, resentment, hatred, and confrontation between ethnic groups shortly after political independence" (Ifeyinwa, 2002: 11). It is worthy of note to highlight that the activities carried out by the colonial master were repressive and exploitative, which in turn led to the subsequent deliberate creation of elites who acted as stooges by proxy for Britain.

These elites were viewed as nationalists, and who were ethnic heads of their respective local bodies shortly after independence, thus increasing the possibility of "prebendal formations and leadership styles, thereby plundering the country's economic bounty" (Ifeyinwa, 2002; Ifeanchio and Nwagwu, 2009). According to Ekanola (2006), "the outcome of ethnic segregation and the fight for parity or supremacy among ethnic and tribal groups in Nigeria were perfected in the people's political actions through modest policies and lawmaking, which included the federal character and quota structure" (Ekanola, 2006: 24).

In other words, cultural pluralism in Nigeria has become dominant in Nigerian politics, which is significantly shaping the people's behavior and reflected in lawmaking and legislative behavior through the auspices of the principle of federalism and quota system in Nigeria. Additionally, Omodia (2010) claims that "prior to elections, party politics in Nigeria cajole the populace by artificially incorporating them into the mechanism of selecting elected leaders through the use of racial and religious criteria" (Omodia, 2010: 14). Thus, the cajoling of the masses by ethnicity and religion to vote in ethnically and religiously inclined politicians in the government, particularly the legislature, coupled with the political tension, ethnic and religious dominance of one group over another, has exacerbated and continues to cadge on the legislative behavior of MPs in the processes of lawmaking.

2.4.4. Private Interest and Personal Ambitions

Mba (2014), while attempting in a journal to demystify Intra-legislative conflicts in Nigeria, posits and pinpoints that the state's role in Nigeria is alarmingly becoming a platform and means to achieve private interest and personal ego. As he argues, the country provides an arena where the socioeconomic condition offers opportunities for most government officials or public officeholders to overcome their poor or inadequate economic power. He argues that "political influence has represented the legislators' private interests in Nigeria and has been further explored to increase private gain for the benefit of their relatives, colleagues, allies, and even praise singers" (Mba, 2014: 7).

Consequently, politics and lawmaking in the country become increasingly prebendal as both the private and sectional interest groups fiercely contest amongst themselves to protect, increase, and defend their share and hold of the state's political and economic powers at their disposal. This character influences the behavior of legislatures in decision makings. Furthermore, Fashagba (2009) identifies the following features of the Nigerian state as being visible in the legislature: "absolutism, arbitrariness, lack of moderating laws, poor authority, and lack of unification of states" (Fashagba, 2009: 11). These features, he asserts, have dominated the legislative behavior of the Nigerian state. Thus, he argued that Nigeria's legislative action is fundamentally one of "conflict motivated by competitive, materialistic interests, and personal ego" (Fashagba, 2009: 11).

2.4.5. The Executive in the Policy-making Process

The authors of a report on how population size influences power sharing in Nigeria claim that the bond between elites and the laws regulating power sharing/separation are constantly broken, making it too weak to balance the potential scale of consensus and peace; as one group fears the other will gain from the current political dispensation, especially when in power, and thus there is sheer distrust and mutual suspicion from the grassroots to institutional levels generally (Wouter & Leila, 2020).

The executive's primary responsibility, which basically "consists of the president, prime minister, premier, or governor (which is dependent on the system being adopted), ministers, special advisers, and the likes, is to intrinsically propose inclusive and consistent policies, to manage and coordinate the affairs of MDA's (Ministries, Departments, and Agencies) which are primarily bestowed the powers to implement policies for the government" (Popoola, 2016: 4).

However, Omotoso (2010) states that "in Nigeria, the president plays a critical and pivotal part in policymaking. He states that Nigeria's president's authority to exercise legislative leadership is both appropriately established and widely agreed " (Omotoso, 2010: 3). Omotoso refers to this period as the "executive-centered era," noting that the president and those living within his established enclave ominously preside over the authority to make policies important or obsolete, enforce or abort; in other words, they are deemed to be the policy brokers. He asserts that "it is self-evident that the president, as executive head, is also supposed to serve as legislative leader" (Omotoso, 2010: 6).

When combined, this has the effect of reducing the evil impulses of governmental actions. Omotoso (2010, in reference to Egomwan, 1991) discussed how previous Nigerian executive administrations had a sizable influence on legislative matters. Additionally, Omotoso (2010) asserts that "The president makes legislative proposals to the legislature and presents them in the form of draft legislation. All of these, the author claims, demonstrate that the executive president is not only

an executive head, but also a legislative leader" (Omotoso, 2010: 4). As such, therefore, constraints on legislative behavior in lawmaking are paramount.

According to Ikelegbe (2006), MPs in Nigeria have practically appeared to largely abdicate lawmaking's constitutional responsibility to the government's executive chamber. He asserts that MPs no longer sway a high and influential power in initiating and or formulating public policies. He argues that they (in most cases) formalize and make legitimate the executive's policies already being formulated. Invariably, it means that the legislative leadership is somewhat cadging the executive's support, a stooge and cruise of the executive regarding policy formulation, and by extension, lawmaking.

Popoola (2016) discusses the reasons that contribute to Nigeria's abdication of legislative duty, which inevitably has an effect on legislative action. He introduced the initial factor "Parliamentarians are divided along party lines as well as racial and religious lines. As a result, MPs lack the requisite impetus for consensus to enact meaningful policies on behalf of the general public. Second, Popoola asserts that many Members of Parliament lack the analytical scope, professionalism, skills, and technocracy necessary to address the dynamic issues confronting contemporary communities and governance that executive functionaries possess " (Popoola, 2016: 4). Thirdly, "MPs exhibit a high degree of flippancy" (Popoola, 2016: 4). In other words, they are a waste of time. Fourthly, they contend that the executive-centered age has made MPs subservient to the executive. He observes that "Members of Parliament are quickly swayed by cash offers or threats of expulsion by the executive arm to do its bidding" (Popoola, 2016: 4). These elements all play a role in influencing legislative action in Nigeria. Nonetheless, considering the circumstances, "MPs continue to play a major role in policymaking in developed political regimes and in the presidential form of government. These, though, become superfluous in oppressive and totalitarian regimes " (Popoola, 2016: 4).

2.5. Theories of Political Behavior

Numerous experiments have been conducted in an attempt to gain a more analytical view of contemporary political thinking and action (Brown and Ainley, 2005; Lindblom, 1977). The conventional approaches to the study of political theory and political science, which focus primarily on the elitists' approach, the institutionalists' approach, and the pluralists' approach, have exemplified the various epistemological and ontological perspectives on political science topics. Nonetheless, these methods did not exist in the study of politics without divisions and methodological disagreements. "The elitists' approach was centered on power manipulation; the institutionalists' approach was centered on constitutional and structural issues; and the pluralist approach was centered on communities' capacity to negotiate" (Brown, 2005: 5).

According to Marsh and Stoker (2010), updating related research and experiments within these approaches was fraught with various difficulties as it came to analyzing political problems. However, several other contemporary approaches have been advanced in order to include theoretical interpretations for political phenomena. Among these famous theories are Rational Action (TRA) and the principle of Planned Action (TPA), which we used as the theoretical foundation for this research. "Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the prevalent belief was that attitude and behavior were inextricably linked and that attitude dictated action" (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).

Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), on the other hand, find little data to support the two variables' prevalent conclusions in an analysis reviewing other experiments on attitude and behaviour. The authors claim that "while attitude should be linked to actions, this is not always the case. Rather than that, they argued that it is the desire to behave, not the attitude toward action, that dictates actual behavior " (Ajzen, 1976: 3). This discovery provided the impetus for the establishment and eventual formulation of the Theory of Reasoned Action. However, TRA was good in describing "behaviors under a person's willful (volitional) influence" but was ineffective at explaining "unwilful (non-volitional) control" of behaviors (Ajzen, 1976: 3).

Thus, Ajzen (1991) resolved this difficulty by adding "an extra construct to the original hypothesis, the theory of planned action (TPB) to it" (Ajzen, 1991: 2, 2002b: 3). As a result, "the TRA and the TPB are not described as behavioral modification theories" ideally (Ajzen, 2002b: 3). However, their efficacy, or more generally, utility, is contingent upon their capacity to investigate and correctly forecast people's behavioral habits and impulsive actions (Ajzen, 2015).

Fishbein (2008) makes the following assertions within the TRA framework: "that behavioral intention, which accounts for the majority of an individual's actions, is an additive construct of two variables: the first are 'attitudes' (positive or negative evaluations of executing a behavior), and the second are 'subjective norms' (perceived influences that others may have). The primary assumption is that an improvement in mindset and subjective norms results in an increase or strengthening in desire to fulfill a certain action" (Fishbein, 2008: 6).

Thus, TRA holds the belief that "when a person views a particular action favorably, he or she would intend to perform it" (Fishbein, 2008: 6). Thus, values often influence an individual's behaviour, causing them to consider the effects of their acts at a certain point in time (behavioral beliefs), which are often articulated by an individual's capacity to evaluate their actions (outcome evaluations). Simply placed, "attitude" refers to an individual's primary opinion about the result of his or her actions (Fishbein, 2006, 2008).

On the other hand, as Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) assert, subjective standards are a feature of individuals' assumptions about whether their conduct is acceptable or unacceptable (Ajzen, 1975: 5).

As Bonfiglioli and Watson (2011) conclude, "subjective normative views are normative. The term "normative social effect" refers to the influence of other people on us, which causes us to adapt in order to be liked and approved by them" (Bonfiglioli and Watson, 2011: 8). Though individual acceptability varies, normative social impact facilitates an individual's compliance with generally agreed norms. In other words, people respond differently because it is certain that others adhere to certain standards or guiding principles.

Thus, the alleged "action in the TRA/TBP is conditioned by beliefs, subjective norms, and volitional regulation in the TRA, and behavioral control in the TPB" (Bonfiglioli and Watson, 2011: 12). Nonetheless, in situations where volitional influence is restricted, the TRA is ineffective at explaining or forecasting behaviour, even though the goal is excellent. As the TPB was developed to resolve this deficiency by behavioral regulation, it was necessary to incorporate and fuse it into the theory. As a result, the TPB was created (Ajzen, 1991, 2002).

The TPB, on the other hand, is a straightforward synonym for the TRA, with the addition of a few atoned extraordinary meanings that make it seem distinct. Thus, it is possible to assert that "action is motivated by intention—intention here referring to the degree and probability to which a person is prone to behave in a particular manner" (Ajzen, 1991: 13). Fishbein and Ajzen (1991, 2002) argue that people are more likely to partake in an action if they want to do so.

CHAPTER THREE

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Method of Data Collection

The main data generated and employed in this dissertation were directly obtained from PLAC Bills records and the National Assembly archives on previously passed bills. A novel dataset was implemented, coded, and analyzed over a period of 6-8 months to get comprehensively lodged information and a clear picture of the system and how the parliamentary behavior in Nigeria operates. Thus, the case selection for this dissertation topic is to study representation in Nigeria, and one of the main aims of the work is to provide a unique dataset on parliamentary behavior in Nigeria (which is an emerging democracy) effectively and transparently to build on in future research continuing on the same path, as it has not been exhaustively researched on.

This chapter will emphasize the presentation, interpretation, and analysis of the data obtained while attempts are made to correlate the figurative data gathered based on the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies' source archives with those gathered from the qualitative literature to establish empirical findings afterward. Here, the unique coding of each variable generated in the course of this dissertation will be explained vividly to give a clearer understanding of our novel dataset. The table below and the following texts provide a summary of the variables used in the study as well as their coding:

Table 1: Variables of the Dataset

Gender
Female-Related Bills
Religion
Distance to Capital
Ethnicity
Local/National Bill
Legislative Experience; First Term
Distance to Capital
Political Party

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

3.1.1. Gender

In the dataset, this variable is coded as in MPs biographical information. To simply distinguish the MPs' sexes distinctively; the male MPs were represented with 0 and the females with 1. This clause was to ensure that the variable will not get mixed up when obtaining crucial information in the course of developing the novel dataset.

3.1.2. Women-Related Bill

Here, this variable got content-coded using the summary information of the bill. That is, if the bills address women's problems (such as abuse against women, female genital mutilation, the gender wage difference, and childbirth care), they are coded 1 when they address women's issues and 0 when they do not.

3.1.3. Distance to Capital

This variable was coded using the provinces' distance to the capital city in terms of kilometers. Since the country has six geopolitical zones, the capital lies in the heart of the country, being the North-central part.

3.1.4. Ethnicity

This variable is content coded based on the MPs' biographical information primarily on the ethnic identity they belong to in Nigeria. Based on our dataset, we have three major ethnic groups, with many other minority groups: Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and others (minorities), so each MP is affiliated to one of these. Thus, the codings go as 1 to the Hausa MPs, 2 to the Yoruba MPs, 3 to the Igbo MPs, and 4 for other very few MPs belonging to the last category (deemed minorities).

3.1.5. Local/National Bill

The local bills are those that majorly concern regional or constituency issues (rural development, district-level projects, constituency infrastructure projects), and the National bills are those regarding the broader state (defense, power, budget, etc.) and affairs carried out externally as well (such as foreign affairs). Therefore, the local bills are coded 1, and where there is a national bill proposal, it is coded 0.

3.1.6. Legislative Experience

This attribute is coded according to the number of terms/years MPs serve in their elected capacities. The term limit threshold for one single tenure is a maximum of 4 years, with a possible renewal as long as the MP is reelected in subsequent elections. The codings made here reflect the number of years the MPs have had before or during the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies, and so they were assigned numerical IDs of between 1 to 20. However, unlike the presidential limit of one 4 year tenure and a maximum of two consecutive 4 years tenure, the MPs' tenure is limitless so long they get reelected by their constituency, and could serve in the parliament for more than 20 years.

3.1.7. First Term

Here, the variable sought to measure the MP's experience in the past and present; hence, the MPs were coded based on whether it was the first time they served under legislative capacities or not. When it is the first tenure, it is coded 1, and when not, it reflects as 0.

3.1.8. Political Party

Here, the variable coded the political parties based on how they were indicated in our dataset for identification purposes. Thus, each MP belongs to one of the existing parties in our dissertation.

3.1.9. Religion

This variable also highlights the MPs' biographical information and is based on the ideological inclination they belong to. In Nigeria, there are two major religions, Islam and Christianity. Simply put, the variable is coded 1 when the MP belongs to the Islamic denomination, or 0 when the MP is affiliated with Christianity.

3.2. Population of Study

In This dissertation, we focus our population on the National Assembly MPs. We proceeded by vividly portraying their biographic information- such as their names, their ethnic and religious backgrounds, their genders, states/regions of origin and their distance from the capital city, their affiliate political parties, the number of bills they have sponsored, and the terms they served in the National Assembly. Although some MPs previously belonged to a different party but decided to switch to either the ruling or other parties, the whole information is up to date based on their current political parties.

More so, much focus on some of the bills was made a priority- such as whether the bills were local/district focused bills, whether they were national bills, and whether they were gender-related bills. Similarly, for comprehension and clarity, the work highlighted the data distribution mainly based on the nations' majorly recognized tribal and religious groups, such as the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo ethnic groups, and thus Christianity and Islamic religious denominations. Lastly, the data analyzed are gathered based on the Seventh and Eighth National Assemblies.

3.3. Center-Periphery Dynamics

The nature of the geographical composition in the Nigerian state is very dynamic because of its composition of a wide range of heterogeneous groups that form up what is today called Nigeria. The country has four regions and six geopolitical zones that are distributed amongst the various groups. North-West, North-Central, North-East, South-East, South-Central, and South-South are the most specific districts. Additionally, these areas have a power-sharing formula that is founded on the elective concept of Nigerian Federalism, which is enshrined in the constitution.

Similarly, right from inception, power (political power) has been more pervasive in the Northern region than in the South because the erstwhile administrative pattern in the North has always been hierarchical, thus making administration more swift and steady; which is contrary to what the Southern region is, and has always been decentralized. The North has a population of over 150 million people compared to the remaining 50 million that the South has. Besides, the Federal Capital city is also situated in the core Northern part of the country, making it a strategic advantage and opportunity for the North and its inhabitants. However, this aids in giving a much better understanding of how the center-periphery dynamics work in Nigeria.

In a bid to provide a succinct analysis, it is imperative to explain how positive it is to hail from an area near the capital city. Therefore, MPs whose native geographic locations are closer to the capital territory- because it is highly developed- tend to enjoy a more political and strategic advantage in terms of intrinsic policies to be undertaken in the legislature. On the one hand, those MPs from the North are more advantaged, as they could benefit from their numerical and proximity advantage- the closer a location is to the capital city, the likelier it is to benefit more policy advantages in Nigeria- and the farther a region is to the capital, the higher the likelihoods of that particular region/MPs getting marginalized.

Inclusively, dynamics of the center-periphery divide also influence the tendencies that an MP whose geographical location is closer to the North to propose more National focused bills than Local bills. Inevitably, those MPs whose regions/geopolitical locations are farther from the center, being the capital city, tend to propose more constituency-related bills for the betterment of their

communities. Finally, the demographical dynamics of Nigeria as regards legislative behavior is dependent on various unique heterogeneous factors across its boundaries. Bills, representation, and development are highly dependent on this very institutional setup that forms what is today known as Nigeria.

3.4. Method of Data Analysis

The study would employ qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Hence it will thrive thoroughly on a juxtaposition of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the data. These methods are applied in order to give more reliability and strengthen the credibility of the research wholly. For the qualitative part, therefore, existing works of literature would be reviewed, and its contents vehemently analyzed, thereby bringing about a critical study outcome and acme understanding of the legislative behavior and lawmaking process in Nigeria holistically.

For the quantitative method, however, the descriptive-empirical research design (which would be a systematic content analysis) using figures and tables will be implemented- hence the result would be expressed as percentages, charts, and or approximated to the nearest whole numbers that will suit the study- to get astutely reliable and objective conclusions on the data information of this dissertation.

3.5. Empirical Analysis

3.5.1. The State of Affairs in Nigeria; Democratization and Gender Issues

As the Nigerian democratic continues to experience significant decays, the parliamentary lawmakers continue to add to the already heaping problems by virtue of their possession of rent-seeking behavior. The more huge budgets are allotted for the legislature, the more the MPs engage in their "routine" clamor for resource distribution by competing with one another and completely forgetting about those at the grassroots who made the mandate they represent possible (Leila, 2020: 3).

Religion and ethnicity in the Nigerian state are two factors that continue to fuel contempt among various groups' MPs in the Parliament, as our data shows. It even goes a long way by influencing individual MPs lobbying on the grounds of these divides. Similarly, this nature of prebendal activities has significantly nurtured the policy inconsistencies that get introduced daily, which ultimately negates the principle of democratization (Leila, 2020: 3). These tendencies have also played significant roles in affecting the MPs' behavior while making laws that border the entire nation. It has gone a long way that it even exists amongst political parties, just as we have seen in this research, and therefore, yielding the nature of Nigerian political culture.

Furthermore, the high level of gender inequality in the Parliament is very symptomatic of the nature of political and social formations of the Nigerian society. Gender inequality in Nigeria also depicts how women are hardly opportune to vote or represent/participate in public service affairs. Thus, the UN Human Development Indicators of years 2019 and 2020 show that the female youth unemployment ratio to those of males stands at (1.50) and total female unemployment standing at (1.20); while human development index stands at (0.504), violence against women (17.4), and finally, shares of seats in the Parliament standing at (4.1) (UNDP, 2020).

The aforementioned factors, coupled together, shape the current political dispensation of the Nigerian state, and therefore, the following section will introduce a few tables that will descriptively explicate the various trends in the legislature thereafter.

Table 2: Distribution of Bills By Chamber

	Representation	
House bills	1274	62.18 %
Senate	775	37.82 %
TOTAL	2049	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

Most of them are beneficial to national causes, and where there are emergency situations in the local arena, and then an executive order gets adopted to speedily implement the process for relief incentives to be adequately provided. The Nigerian legislature's cumulative number of bills is divided between the two Houses, being the House of Representatives (lower chamber) with about 62.2% and the Senate (higher chamber) with bills amounting to 37.82%. However, there are several bills amounting to 180, which are sponsored by the entire legislature, but as deliberation failed to reach a compromise, the Executive, therefore, in these instances, take a stance by upholding any Bill by Executive Order in order to get the bills validated; usually, these bills are National-focused and are basically in terms of Defense and Security, Power, Economy, and other emergencies therewith.

Table 3: Distribution of Bills by Local and National Bills

	Representation	
Local bills	178	8.69 %
National bills	1871	91.31 %
TOTAL	2049	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

As this factor focuses on constituency-related issues and so the MP's who push for these bills to be implemented tend to have ulterior motives of wanting reelection. Despite the number of local

bills' proposals standing at a low compared to national bills, most new MPs may take advantage of this situation to somewhat portray themselves as symbolic representatives of the people at the grassroots (as they are acting upon descriptive representation). Moreover, by so doing, their actions (the MPs) may somewhat be deemed a heroic act by the grassroots population; this way, although the practice may not be consistent with the political party's priorities to which they belong, it would earn them popularity and be a positive mark for their party as well.

The data above shows the distribution of bills related to National Bills (those that are nation-centrist) with a more significant percentage of 91.3% against Local Bills (constituency and grassroots related and the likes) at just 8.69%. Therefore, it is evident that MPs are not really concerned by bills bothering their various constituencies, which could have aided in fostering grassroots development through community inclusion in sponsoring bills that would benefit the nation. Thus, it is a huge setback that people at the constituency elect their representatives at the highest decision-making government bodies, but they yet get abandoned and denied their rights to benefit from their very own nation's proceeds.

Table 4: Distribution of Bills by MP's-Religion

	Representation	
Muslim	670	35.81 %
Christian	1201	64.19 %
TOTAL	1871	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019.

Religion and representation could always be symbolic, descriptive, and or even substantive. Nigeria is a very heterogeneous country with very high variants of cultural and ethnic cleavages, with most affiliated to either one of the religious denominations. As both ethnic and religious elements drive the societal operations, these factors streamline down to the ordinary citizens' everyday lives and work simultaneously with politics. Representation is also highly attached to religion, and the trend is always obviously showcased, even at the highest level of administrative bodies.

Client-patron networks are also built and operated upon this element, which tends to be a norm in the country. In most cases, representatives are chosen based on their religious denominations, and when times to propose bills are due, they (MPs) tend to assess the pros and cons of the said bill if it contradicts the principles of the religious denomination they belong. e.g., gay rights bill, abortion bills, etc. The former tends to be prosecuted (the sam-sex perpetrators thereof) with fourteen (14) years of imprisonment. The latter (abortion) is guided in the Northern part of the country by the Penal code Code and the South by the Criminal Code to enforce punishment to perpetrators- except if the

birth will be life-threatening to the so-called mother. These are but a few of the instances of descriptive and symbolic representation in the Nigerian political arena.

Therefore, the distribution above shows the number of bills sponsored by MPs of the main religious groups- Islam and Christianity. The Muslim MPs sponsored bills totaling about 35.8%, while the Christian MPs did sponsor a whopping 64% of the total bills sponsored by both groups. This clause shows how effectively participatory the predominantly Christian MPs are in lawmaking- despite the North being the seat of power because of its size and population. Moreover, this reveals the possible literacy rate among MPs serving in the National Assembly; the more literate MPs are, the more the number of bills will be sponsored, and the more the chances of sponsoring consistent bills that would serve the betterment of all citizens.

It is imperative to note that MPs who are Christians are most predominantly from Southern parts of Nigeria, and on the other hand, Muslim legislators predominate mostly in the country's north and central regions. Nonetheless, amid the Northern and majority-Muslim MPs having a more significant presence in the National Assembly- due to the Elective Principle of Representation (EPR) in synchrony with the six (6) Geopolitical Zones- the Southern MPs sponsor more bills than they do. Hence, this shows that there may be policy inconsistencies in lawmaking because it exposes these MPs' inefficiency at the helm of affairs on sponsoring 'consistently inclusive' bills that would advance the nation's polity, not just legislating with prebendal-driven tendencies.

Table 5: Distribution of Bills by Ethnic Background

	Representation	
Hausa	632	33.74 %
Yoruba	392	20.93 %
Ibgo	709	37.85 %
Others	140	7.47 %
TOTAL= 4	1873	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

This variant is peculiar to what is being experienced from the effects of religion in Nigeria. As the issue of power tussle sets the pace in legislative affairs in the Nigerian legislature, the division of power instigated by a weaker parliamentary system and weaker party discipline coupled with the power tussle from the multiple numbers of ethnic variants existent within the parliament (major and minor cleavages), plays a massive role in the parliamentary process. This factor is reminiscent of what Lore (2016) said about "more possibilities for distinction among members of the same political party". Thus, it strikes a direct link between MPs' actions and their behavior during lawmaking. Each ethnic denomination desires to be in charge, just as shown in our data.

More so, these ethnic denominations' representation in the parliament reflects the descriptive nature of representation in the Nigerian legislature because it symbolizes the presence of every or most unit of the country's grassroots in the administrative affairs of the nation. In Nigeria, in as much as religion plays a huge role in determining political affairs in the nation, ethnicity also operates in a wide range of places. In this research, the parliament's known major ethnic groups were calculated and compared in percentages. Despite some Ethnic groups holding majority seats in the legislature (considering the elective principle of representation based on size and population of each region), the possibility of other minority group MPs' exposure might excessively play significant roles, such as education, political experience, and the likes.

Therefore, the table shows that MPs belonging to the Igbo ethnic group, despite being the third major ethnic group in the ranking, have more bill representations of 37.85%. In contrast, the Hausa ethnic group, known as the largest ethnic group in Nigeria, has about 33.74% Bill representation, and the MPs belonging to the Yoruba ethnic group have a representation of 20.93%. Meanwhile, other ethnic groups composed of all other MPs belonging to minority groups have 7.47% of the bills proposed. These tendencies are seemingly impossible to detach from the nation's political and social atmosphere because the institutional landscape is built upon these cleavages.

Table 6: Distribution of Bills by MPs Gender

	Representation	
Female	26	5.54 %
Male	443	94.45 %
TOTAL	469	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

Although the women in Nigerian society have not had a long history of political participation, which puts them in a disadvantaged position compared to their male counterparts, the identity they come along with at the synopsis of their political career may play substantive roles. Therefore, regarding gender consciousness, feminism, and more significant political representation opportunities, it enables them to develop and achieve tremendous feminist outcomes. The Male MPs are well in control of parliamentary affairs, and for this reason, the finding shows that the stark gender difference in the Nigerian Parliament translates to high female under-representation in Nigerian political affairs.

Hence, for there to be a more inclusive representation, women need to be handed the opportunity to participate in the nation's affairs and not just left with the parochial tradition of the role of undertaking only 'maternal tasks.' As feminists popularly argue, attributing women to solely maternal roles would instead create a rejoinder by starkly criticizing the so-called feasting difference

between women and men, and thereby noting that 'people are biologically unsuited to political life's bellicosity' (Allwood et al., 2004: 388).

Similarly, the table above shows how underrepresented women are in the legislature. There is a massive disparity between the gender of MPs, with about 94% of the total number of seats to men, while the female MPs represent just 5.5% of the Parliament seats. Therefore, this disparity shows clearly the reason why women are underrepresented in the Nigerian political spectrum. Though the number of female members has increased in recent years, much needs to be achieved in terms of a 'Quota Expansion to at least 30%' specifically allocated for female MPs/representatives in order to achieve a breakthrough on this stark imbalance in the Nigerian political space.

Even though cultural forces play a significant role in influencing the nation's political and social relations, there is an urgent need to increase women's representation or to stake a fixed number of seats exclusively for women in each election. It also vividly shows the strength and manifestation of patriarchy in the Nigerian political dispensation.

Table 7: Distribution of Bills by Gender-Related Clause

	Representation	
Female Related	19	0.93 %
Non-Female Related	2030	99.07 %
TOTAL	2049	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

As women seek to act as spokespersons to the people they symbolically represent, the notion that they dwell in the space of functional representation makes them differ from those who dwell upon just constituency and party (Squires, 1999: 203). More so, other scholars argue that representatives could be deemed experienced and thus focus on substantial issues related to women (Kurebawa, 2015). Similarly, Philips (1995) added that;

..."Women have unique interests in childbearing...because, as culture is presently structured, they still have unique interests as a result of their susceptibility to sexual abuse and brutality, their disproportionate status in the distribution of paid and unpaid labour, and their omission from the majority of economic influence arenas..." (Philips, 1995: 67).

This summation strikes a heavy call on the fact that despite the fact that women are always attributed to maternal affairs due to the way the society operates- especially when cultural cleavages play significant roles in societal affairs, like Nigeria- there could be tendencies that also feel obliged to fight/cater for the needs of other fellow women by assiduously pushing to get bills through, especially those that relate women issues.

Thus, the aforementioned table above shows that the distribution of female-related bills against others is significantly lesser in representation, which is less than 1% to the rest (other issues), which stand way above 99%. One of the main reasons for this factor is that the parliament is majorly comprised of male representatives who seek other interests than just feminine-related ones. This suggests that the more women in the legislature, the more likely it is that feminine/women-related legislation will be proposed, approved, and enacted. This loophole is still very much having a significant effect on the legislative politics and other sectors of the nation's polity.

Table 8: Distribution of Bills by MPs' Female-Related Bills Representation

	Representation	
FRB by Female MPs	4	21.05 %
FRB by Male MPs	15	78.96 %
TOTAL	19	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

Inasmuch as the bills are female-oriented, more male MPs were involved in sponsoring these bills. The total number of female MPs in these assembly periods was 19, but most of the bills they proposed were not substantively gender-inclined; hence they would have symbolically represented the gender cause, but sadly although the female MPs were perpetually considered present to further the interest of other women while practically representing them by virtue of descriptive representation, they still do not act upon the substantive stance- so the male MPs instead act on these capacities. Many reasons may lead to this development, ranging from party goals, roll-call voting, and the likes.

In terms of representation, women are given fewer quotas of seats in the legislature. As discussed in the literature, the more women are allowed to represent- about the significant disparity in participation in the national legislature, the few female MPs present appear to serve as symbolic leaders (in terms of expressive representation)—the more they can inspire their female equivalents to rise and contest elections or gain representation in administrative relations. When descriptive representation of the female gender grows in the legislature, the idea of a symbolic representation becomes more viable- and that holds an aura of hope to others- thereby gearing substantive representation as we have seen in the case of the bills passed in the Nigerian legislature, which are mainly gender-oriented.

Be it as it may, despite the cultural formation of the Nigerian society of not having had a history of many female representatives, there seems to be progress on that course, as recent years have shown vividly with increased female representation in Nigeria's administrative affairs.

Table 9: Distribution of Bills by Political Party

Political Parties	Number of Seats/Representation	
PDP	998	48.99 %
APC	965	47.37 %
SDP	30	1.47 %
APGA	22	1.08 %
ADC	11	0.54 %
DPP	4	0.20 %
PRP	4	0.20 %
ACCORD	1	0.05 %
ADP	1	0.05 %
LP	1	0.05 %
TOTAL= 10	2,037	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

As the political parties hurdle to passionately relate with the various constituent units to somewhat fulfill their plights independently, they tend to showcase that they are aware of the needs of the very same people who elected them into office. However, as they (political parties) represent beliefs, identities, and interests of their constituents (symbolically), they always behave in accordance with party manifestos and then increase their representation in the legislative system in order to exert greater influence over the legislature's operations.

When a party has more members than its competitors (other political parties), it is likely to command majority seats in the parliament, leaving them with high leverage on the parliamentary floor related to debates, policy, and bill proposals. According to the table above, the two main political parties, the APC and the PDP, are responsible for proposing and approving legislation. The former introduced approximately 47.37 percent of all bills, while the PDP proposed 48.99 percent of all bills. It is critical to note that the PDP was the political party in charge from 1999, when democracy began its process in the nation's polity, until the 7th Assembly (a period of 16 years); therefore, this aspect may be understood in part why the party has enjoyed such a strong advantage in terms of representation and bill sponsorship in the legislative chamber.

Other parties with few bill sponsorship representations are the SDP with 1.47%, the APGA with 1.08%, the ADC with 0.54%, and finally DPP with the least representation being 0.20%. Party politics in Nigeria is highly volatile, that it could turn violent. For this reason, therefore, there are always are conflict possibilities amongst parties, or even in worst-case scenarios, political party defections as a result of internal party conflicts that tend to be uncontained effectively. Thus, the political parties' quest for descriptive representation could be related to the notion that representation equals symbolic representation, which ultimately equals policy responsiveness (Mishler & Rose, 1997: 6).

Table 10: Distribution of Bills by MPs Legislative Experience

	(4 years threshold)	
MPs with 0-2.5 years	586	32.85 %
3	14	0.75 %
4	719	40.30 %
5	25	1.40 %
6	7	0.39 %
8	245	13.73%
9	18	1.01 %
11	22	1.23 %
12	131	7.34 %
13	17	0.95 %
16	46	2.58 %
TOTAL	1784	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

Experience in political affairs and representation is very crucial. The more experienced an MP is, the more their chances of getting renominated. When representatives act effectively towards responding to consistent and coherent laws that are responsive to the needs of the citizens, they tend to bolster their chances of renomination. The aforementioned table shows the distribution of bills by MPs per legislative experience (MPLE), which means that every MP belongs to one category of the assigned number of percentage (explained in terms of years serving in a legislative capacity at the National Assembly) in the percentage order to which they belong.

MPs who have had between 0-2.5 years of experience have about 32.85% of the bills sponsored (which is a good number as MPs who fall within this category tend to be very active in parliamentary affairs in a bid to prolong their stay). Those with three years of legislative experience have about 0.75% of the total sponsored bills; those with four years of legislative experience have the highest number of bills sponsored at about 40.4% of the total. Meanwhile, those with five years of legislative experience have about 1.40% of bills sponsored.

Those with six years of experience sought to sponsor the least number of bills and stand at 0.39%. Those with eight years of legislative experience have about 13.7% sponsored bills, and those with nine years of experience have about 1% sponsored bills. Similarly, those with 11, 12 and 13 years of legislative experience sponsored bills amounting to 1.2%, 7.3%, and 0.9%, respectively. Lastly, those with the highest legislative experience of 16 years or more had about 2.58% of the total number of bills sponsored in the legislature.

From the preceding, it would be noted that instead of MPs who have had previous experience to act particularly more participatory in bills' sponsorship, the reverse is the case because the

distribution is different. Those who have had more experience tend to be more relaxed in parliamentary affairs (and resort to just administration and compliance), so they do not push radically for bill sponsoring. On the other hand, those who are very new to the system (say 0-4 years of experience) tend to mobilize more and actively in bill sponsorship to get impactful and nurture their tendency of being reelected for a second or third term in the legislature, while those who have had more experience tend to seat and maintain their positions without potential rivalry or threats of displacement.

Sometimes, the center-periphery dynamics come to play when MPs struggle to balance power struggle in the parliament. On a general note, however, new legislators tend to be more vibrant in parliamentary affairs because they crave to get reelected, establish their prebendal connections and advertise themselves as the symbolic representatives for the constituencies compared to their senior colleagues who have already had five years and above of legislative experience.

Table 11: Distribution of Bills by Party-Sponsored Local Bills

	Representation	
APC	106	59.55 %
PDP	65	36.52 %
SDP	3	1.69 %
ADC	1	0.56 %
TOTAL	178	

Source: PLAC Bills, NASS, 2019

The above distribution shows the number of local-centric or constituency bills sponsored by various political parties in the Nigerian legislature. As the concept of interest broadens, it would be understood that enabling societal participation in political affairs tends to result in more possibilities of substantial representation, per se. Thus, the multidimensionality of representation can be translated to interests because the political parties' interest relies not only on societal engagement but also on reelection bid by showcasing their symbolic presence- with a pretext- 'for all' while controlling the helm of affairs.

For this reason, therefore, the political parties tend to push for more bill proposals so that they will garner more support from the masses, thereby somewhat putting themselves in a stance where reelection may be inevitable and opponents neutralized. Local bills' sponsorships/proposals are a good way that most political parties in Nigeria garner support for popularity and reelection from the ordinary masses therewith. Therefore, the center-periphery dynamic also comes to play here because tremendous support is needed from the grassroots (be it prebendal formations and client-patron networks) in order that an existing ruling political party maintains its popularity and grip topower.

The APC, being the current ruling political party, sponsored a total of about 59.6% bills, which is almost about half its runner-up, the PDP. The PDP had 36.5% constituency-related bills sponsored, the SDP had about 1.7%, and the last being the ADC with a total of just 0.56% of bills. This trend shows how nation-centric the legislature is by virtue of its little concern on constituency bills that would positively impact the local population and development. By and large, the above analysis has tried to justify how the various cleavages existent within the Nigerian social and political structure performs.

Therefore, the variants provided insights into how significantly intertwined they all function and why the system tends to be in its current condition. Also, another factor to glance at is the patterns in which these trends adopt, which vividly explain how political parties holding majority seats in the legislature seek to possess the will and authority to pass more bills than minor ones.



CONCLUSION

Democratization in Nigeria is a long-sought ideal despite the continued frailties and challenges posed by the nation's very internal structure, which has been the root cause of what has been continually experienced over the last twenty years since the country became a fully transformed Presidential democracy in 1999. Thus, many factors play enormous roles in forming the institutional setup evident within the nation's polity.

The aim of this work was to examine legislative studies in the framework of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as the topic has received little attention. Thus, legislative behavior has been thoroughly studied mainly in the context of consolidated and developed Western and highly institutionalized countries with a strong tradition of parliamentary behavior and politics, which have their rules and procedures existing for decades if not centuries. Studies on less institutionalized and developing nations, on the other hand, remain limited. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by first and foremost, providing institutional data and be one of the first studies on legislative behavior in Africa and in Nigeria.

Similarly, the research showed how essential it is to see why legislative behavior is shaped in a uniquely different context where parliamentary politics and legislative behavior in Nigeria and most African countries is an absolutely new phenomenon (considering the nature of how the difference between the developed Western countries' dispensation and the existing nature of heterogeneous dispensation in the Nigerian system prevails). As Nigeria is still an unconsolidated and transitioning democracy, the trend is shaped by the different factors that outline the prevailing parliamentary system in Nigeria at large.

In the course of this research, a novel dataset was created to decipher the modus operandi of parliamentary affairs in the Nigerian legislature. Although the data used in this research was quite limited (case and year-specific), the methodology we relied on was the collection and use of original firsthand data from the Nigerian Parliament and from PLAC Bills (where a history of bills passed in the legislature over the years is being compiled for reference). The study also specifically focused on bills passed between 2011 and 2019 (seventh and eighth) Assemblies to get a clear picture of the institution's political interplay and how the democratic consolidation trends unfold.

While the data were collated and analyzed, several factors that affect parliamentary affairs were observed, which exposed the Nigerian parliamentary system's defining features and the driving factors that shape parliamentarians' legislative behavior and parliamentary politics at large

The bills that were analyzed were segmented into significant variables that sought to be crucial, and hence answered our research questions, ranging from ethnicity, religion, gender, and party affiliation, to get a clearer glimpse of how the Nigerian legislature functions driven by these forces. It clearly exposed the basis of how the institution is shaped and operated in the Nigerian political arena (and even a replica of other developing African democracies newly adopting parliamentary systems into their already existing government administrative systems).

Looking at the political structure and how certain variables that were studied in this research play significant roles (such as religion, ethnicity, party affiliation, and gender), and how this juncture differs from the developed Western democracies' parliamentary behavior/system, it is imperative to note that these variables classically shape the type of political formation and parliamentary politics existent in Nigeria. Therefore, these factors have exposed how starkly distinct Nigerian and, mostly, African parliamentary politics is from those of its Western and more developed democratic counterparts. Hence, these trends will give more insights into the way Nigerian democracy is perceived and operated therein.

From religious and ethnic perspectives, the findings have shown how MPs assemble and unite based on religion and ethnicity to circumvent democratically set up guidelines to get their interests served. Bills being passed in the Parliament are lobbied based on the cleavages determining the modus operandi in the Nigerian legislature, i.e., certain offices are maintained and run by members of a specific religious or ethnic group (major ones), and with pretexts of general representation in the matters concerning the nation.

Thus, ethnicity always surfaces when issues related to implementing or sponsoring local or constituency bills arise. It is always problematic to adduce a common policy goal that would serve the interest of specific or every constituent unit in the state because of its various ethnic groups who have divergent policy or developmental interests that need to be served by their representatives. Hence representation by representatives of the legislature may be one-sided and indispensable in other words.

Similarly, this research shows that it has always been problematic to attain common resolutions amongst various diverse groups in topics related to policy implementation and national foresight because these elements continually run the system. Therefore, this highlights the functions played by the prebendal nature of political affairs, which is also a continuing trend hitherto. The parliament, where lawmaking ought to reflect consistent laws that serve the benefit of the general masses, instead takes its toll on siphoning funds and is highly reflective on its prebendal nature holistically.

Succinctly, this dissertation showed how clearly there could be a difference between the various ethno-religious groups' policy implementation drive and level of exposure to Western education (with a reasonable level of representation). This clause is exemplary to how MPs from the Southern parts of the state, despite their numerical disadvantage in the legislature and other public service capacities in the country, pass a way higher number of bills at the Parliament compared to their Northern counterparts who occupy more number of seats and even primarily those deemed more "crucial seats."

As the factors mentioned above continue to shape some of the bills being passed in the Parliament, the Federal Republic's constitution is often amended to "create and maintain a balance", and call for more equality amongst the sidelined minority groups thereafter. The "regionalizing" political parties in Nigeria have always been on the troll even right before the state attained a complete democratic transition, which is still reflected in the early development of political parties during the colonial era until hitherto.

Furthermore, the dissertation exposed how greatly gender representation in Nigeria has been problematic. The gender inequality gap is sadly far wider than could ever be imagined. In the legislature, there is about slightly above 5% representation of women, which stands at 180th rank and is one of the lowest percentage representation in the world (IPU Parline, 2021). Thus, this trend has always been static, continued, and has experienced little or no change as the state's structural formation tends to permit such manifestation to thrive despite the female gender having had the necessary qualifications (educational and professional) to contribute to the quota of politics and policies affecting their country.

The analyses demonstrate that only roughly 0.8% of the total number of bills examined in the Parliament was gender-related, which is undoubtedly one of the lowest compared to other democracies of the world. By and large, from the aforementioned analysis and data available, this dissertation has validated the premise that legislative behavior in Nigeria is directly affected by various exogenous and endogenous factors as highlighted in our analysis (gender, religion, ethnicity and party affiliation), and the conditioning status-quo also determines and reflects on every lawmaking process within the nation's parliamentary atmosphere.

This research was able to expose some significantly critical findings. One is how the exogenous factors such as religion and politics shape MPs' and policymakers' behavior while making laws and how it goes a long way in influencing a considerable part of the social formation. Second is ethnicity, which is deemed endogenous and has been what sought to fuse into the people's everyday lives in society (otherwise known as the local or grassroots factor), hence influencing every part of their impulses; in other words, it is replicated in the attitudes of MPs and policymakers while they make policies centered towards the state.

In this research, we found that gender inequality has been very critical in Nigerian society. Policies made are not at all gender-sensitive, so there is a massive lapse in this aspect that needs much work to be done in order to fix this recurring loophole in the Nigerian administrative system. Therefore, there need to be critically holistic reforms for these factors affecting policymaking and the policymakers alike to represent all better and ensure swift democratic dispensation in Nigeria.

This dissertation will also advance legislative studies and opportune researchers and academicians alike to get critical reference points from a typically developing democracy in Africa, Nigeria. The heterogeneous and complex societal composition (ethnicity and religion) is interestingly prime to getting understood in order to be able to analyze situations of societies of such peculiar forms. There has not been much research carried out on topical issues as African legislative behavior and gender studies, and none at all has been carried out on this exact research topic of this dissertation. Thus, it is the first of its kind and would go a long way to be continually developed by other concerned researchers and academicians alike.

The dissertation also showed how important it is to explore the Nigerian case specifically and what determines how legislative behavior operates and differs from other developed Western consolidated democracies. Nigeria is a newly consolidating democracy trying to establish its institutional rules and procedures peculiar to its terrain (influenced by cleavages). Considering how heterogenic it is in nature compared to its already developed, strongly institutionalized Western counterparts, it is imperative to see how parliamentary affairs as a new phenomenon in Nigeria thrive with its existing institutional setup.

Due to insufficient data, the novel dataset employed to explore the legibility of our questions and objectives to get feasible findings to this dissertation were just specific to the main cleavages in Nigeria (religion, ethnicity, and gender). This further gives an opportunity for more research that will be centered on Nigeria and Africa at large, and to be carried out based on broad contents. Further research should focus on the content of bills, roll-call voting tendencies of parliamentarians, party dissenting, local and district magnitudes, age and term limits- including local cleavages that tend to affect the systems' institutional framework that is distinct from the known Western-styled institutionalism. Future research should also pay attention to the role of clientelism in Nigeria and other newly consolidating African democracies.

This study may serve as a synopsis of parliamentary/legislative politics research in the context of Nigeria and other consolidating democracies in Africa, thereby paving the way for comparison between the Western-styled parliamentary system's idea and those of Africa and Nigeria in particular.

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